

























































































































ante	balance	of	power	cause	both	players	to	believe	they	are	better	off	paying	the	costs	of	engaging	in	military	combat	to	achieve	their	goals,	rather	than	accept	the	peace	on	offer	(Blainey,	1988;	Reiter,	2009;	Slantchev,	2003).	It	assumes	unitary	actors	with	fixed	power	at	the	start	of	the	conflict.			Dan	Reiter	(2009),	building	on	Geoffrey	Blainey’s	On	the	Causes	of	War	(1988),	argues	that	once	war	breaks	out,	battles	reveal	information	that	alter	perceptions	about	 the	 likelihood	 of	 winning	 and	 the	 costs	 that	 need	 to	 be	 expended	 to	triumph.	Providing	the	belligerents	overcome	credible	commitment	problems,	as	the	 true	 balance	 of	 power	 is	 revealed,	 both	 actors	 identify	 a	 settlement	 that	divides	 the	object	 in	dispute	without	having	 to	pay	 the	costs	of	continuing	 the	conflict.	Both	actors	are	better	off	than	if	they	had	fought	the	war	to	its	conclusion.	If	they	continue	to	disagree	on	the	balance	of	power,	the	war	resumes	until	there	is	another	battle,	revealing	further	information.	Reiter’s	book	is	principally	about	interstate	wars	and	he	 supports	his	hypothesis	with	a	number	of	 cases.	Other	scholars	 have	 also	 found	 strong	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 support	 for	 this	approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 interstate	 conflict	 (Fearon,	 1995;	 Ramsay,	 2008;	Slantchev,	2003).			
Comparative	literature	on	civil	war	endings	






2004;	p304).	Cunningham,	Gleditsch	and	Salehyan	 reinforced	 this	notion;	 “the	outcome	 and	 duration	 …	 (being)	 a	 function	 of	 the	 balance	 of	 the	 military	capabilities	between	the	state	and	rebels”	(2009;	p572).		Using	 this	 logic,	 scholars	 first	 examined	 the	 role	 of	 state	 capacity	 in	 shaping	conflict	 dynamics	 and	 outcomes.	 Articles	 focusing	 on	 state	 capacity	 revealed	interesting	insights	(Collier	et	al.,	2004;	DeRouen	and	Sobek,	2004;	Fearon,	2004).	However,	by	applying	a	 static	balance	of	power	 framework	 they	 failed	 to	 fully	explain	some	of	their	empirical	findings.			Scholars	attempted	to	improve	these	models	by	adding	variables	measuring	rebel	strength.	 Cunningham,	Gleditsch	 and	 Salehyan	 argued	 that	many	 of	 the	 above	articles	 fail	 to	 fully	 capture	 civil	 war	 dynamics	 because	 they	 only	 look	 at	 the	government	(2009;	p571).	By	presenting	and	analysing	a	dataset	on	the	balance	of	power,	they	presented	a	number	of	interesting	findings.	Most	pertinent	for	this	thesis,	they	found	that	when	rebel	groups	are	larger	they	do	better	(p574).			Academics	have	tried	to	build	on	Cunningham	et	al.’s	work	by	using	year-on-year	data	 of	 rebel	 numbers1	 (Clayton,	 2013;	Hultquist,	 2013).	 Govinda	Clayton	 and	Philip	Hultquist	support	Cunningham	et	al.’s	observation	that	rebel	groups	being	larger	affects	the	outcome	of	civil	wars.	Tellingly,	however,	Hultquist	finds	that	rebel	 groups	 being	 smaller	 does	 not	 predict	 a	 government	 victory,	 suggesting	focusing	on	rebel	numbers	can	only	tell	us	so	much	(2013;	p624).		
	


























augmented	conventional	operations	with	terrorist	and	guerrilla	activity	in	areas	it	was	weaker,	such	as	Baghdad	or	Damascus.	How	do	we	classify	civil	wars	that	bridge	 these	 categories	 through	 time	 and	 even	more	 problematically	 through	space?	If	rebels	simultaneously	carry	out	both	types	of	activity,	there	must	be	a	longer-term	objective	behind	this	activity,	most	obviously	creating	the	conditions	to	strengthen	the	group.			The	 current	 comparative	 literature	 of	 civil	 war	 endings	 leaves	 a	 number	 of	questions	unanswered:	Why	is	looking	at	the	balance	of	power	of	limited	value?	Why	do	rebel	groups	change	 in	size?	And,	why	do	conflicts	 transition	between	different	phases?	Understanding	war	as	a	competition	to	mobilise	resources,	in	which	rebels	create	opportunities	 to	grow	as	a	movement	by	undermining	the	government’s	ability	to	generate	support	offers	a	framework	for	answering	many	of	these	questions.			
Insurgent	alliances	






Michael	Findley	and	Peter	Rudloff	(2012)	show	that	insurgent	fragmentation	is	ubiquitous	 and	must	 be	 accepted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 structure	 that	 underpins	 civil	wars.	Macro-level	outcomes	are	decided	by	the	micro-level	decisions	of	conflict	participants,	which	 in	 turn	are	shaped	by	the	ability	of	national	 level	actors	 to	affect	those	decisions	as	the	war	drags	on.			According	to	Stephen	Biddle,	Jeffrey	A.	Friedman	and	Jacob	N.	Shapiro	in	Testing	






Both	Stathis	Kalyvas	 (2006)	 and	Lee	Seymour	 (2014)	 argue	 it	 is	 the	 ability	of	national-level	actors	to	manage	these	processes	and	build	alliances	that	dictates	the	 outcomes	 of	 civil	wars.	 Seymour	 (2014)	 looks	 at	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 that	affect	the	capacity	of	leaders	to	build	alliances	in	Sudan	and	shows	the	power	of	national	leaders	is	based	on	their	capacity	to	empower	local	armed	groups	to	do	their	 bidding.	When	 no	 single	 actor	 can	 control	 the	whole	 polity	 in	 this	 way,	multiple	 armed	 factions	 are	 able	 to	 operate.	 What	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 military	stalemate	is	actually	a	political	equilibrium.			
Limits	of	the	‘insurgent	alliance’	approach	






the	exact	same	reasons	they	join	rebel	groups.4	Any	theory	of	alliance	building	that	 wants	 to	 link	 macro-level	 outcomes	 and	 dynamics	 with	 micro-level	population	decision-making	(and	vice-versa)	needs	to	explain	this	as	well	if	it	is	to	be	a	complete	explanation.			
Bringing	in	the	population	


































	The	rest	of	this	thesis	attempts	to	address	many	of	the	questions	raised	above.	It	will	be	divided	into	two	main	parts,	a	theory	and	an	empirical	section.	The	theory	section	will	first	discuss	the	concept	of	war	as	a	mobilisation	game,	answering	the	first	 puzzle	 -	 why	 do	 belligerents	 dedicate	 resources	 to	 shaping	 population	behaviour?	The	 second	chapter	will	 show	how	 this	 framework	 can	be	used	 to	explain	how	small	militant	groups	defeat	strong	governments.	I	will	argue	that	the	main	element	of	the	mobilisation	competition	is	rebel	efforts	to	degrade	the	structures	 governments	 use	 to	 generate	 support.	 Consequently,	 rebels	 do	 not	need	to	match	the	government	militarily	to	achieve	their	strategic	aims.					Having	established	my	theory,	 the	thesis	will	 test	 it	empirically	using	a	mixed-methods	approach.	The	empirical	sections	of	the	thesis	lend	strong	support	to	the	theory.	 The	 model	 of	 war	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 therefore,	 provides	policymakers	and	strategic	decision-makers	a	template	for	understanding	wars	around	the	world	that	has	been	tested	with	academic	rigour	across	a	wide	variety	of	conflicts.			
	
Definitions	
	Before	 proceeding	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 define	 a	 number	 of	 terms	 that	 I	 use	throughout	the	thesis,	but	can	be	ambiguous	in	nature.			
Civil	war	







“Armed	 combat	 taking	place	within	 the	boundaries	of	 a	 recognized	(sic)	sovereign	entity	between	parties	subject	to	a	common	authority	at	the	outset	of	the	hostilities”	(p417).		As	Kalyvas	points	out,	this	definition	rests	upon	there	being	a	military	challenge	to	the	government	from	within	the	state	from	an	organised	force	“with	military	equipment	and	full-time	recruits”	(ibid.).			Most	of	this	thesis	also	assumes	that	the	government	remains	a	functioning	entity.	In	some	civil	wars,	such	as	Libya	after	the	fall	of	Colonel	Qadaffi,	even	the	nominal	government	is	represented	by	an	alliance	of	irregular	militias.	While	the	logic	of	chapter	one	can	be	applied	 to	all	 civil	wars,	many	of	 the	 caveats	developed	 in	chapter	two	require	there	to	be	a	functioning	government.	No	such	restriction	is	placed	on	the	type	of	rebel	force	the	government	faces.		
	
The	population	









































































greater	than	the	27	to	one,	or	seven	percent	of	the	population,	rebels	have	needed	(Lichbach,	1998;	Molnar,	1966).			Belligerents	also	generate	support	from	external	sources	or	tapping	into	criminal	networks	 (Ross,	 2004).	 It	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 belligerents	 will	 be	 able	 to	generate	 support	 from	 the	 population	 without	 access	 to	 resources	 from	elsewhere,	hence	the	focus	they	place	on	appealing	to	external	patrons	(Connable	and	Libicki,	2010).	External	support	also	affects	what	belligerents	need	to	elicit	from	 the	 population	 and	 how	 they	 go	 about	 realising	 it.	 For	 example,	 even	 a	hypothetical	conflict	actor	that	meets	all	of	its	manpower,	material	and	financial	needs	 from	 external	 sources	 still	 needs	 to	 pacify	 potential	 supporters	 of	 its	opponents.	In	reality,	no	such	actor	exists	and	belligerents	use	external	support	or	control	over	natural	resources	to	build	an	internal	movement	(Beardsley	and	McQuinn,	 2009;	 Collier	 and	 Hoeffler,	 2004;	 Mampilly,	 2011;	 Ross,	 2004;	Weinstein,	 2007).	 The	 quantity	 and	 type	 of	 support	 belligerents	 receive	 from	other	sources	may,	in	turn,	affect	how	they	choose	to	build	this	movement	(see	for	example	(Beardsley	and	McQuinn,	2009;	Mampilly,	2011;	Weinstein,	2007)).7			








































Examples	 of	 this	 type	 of	 incentive	 include	 direct	 economic	 incentives.	 Samuel	Popkin’s,	The	Rational	Peasant,	explains	peasant	support	for	the	Vietcong	on	the	basis	of	individuals	within	the	population	responding	to	the	economic	incentives	the	insurgency	offered	(1979).	Another	selective	within-conflict	benefit	may	be	the	 political	 or	 social	 standing	 that	 supporting	 a	 belligerent	 will	 provide	 the	individual.	 David	 Lan	 argues	 that	 spirit	 mediums	 cooperated	 with	 the	 ZANU	insurgency	 in	Zimbabwe	 in	order	 to	 reassert	 the	political	power	 they	had	 lost	during	the	period	of	white-rule	(Lan,	1985).		An	 example	 of	 a	 selective	 within-conflict	 cost	 is	 the	 probability	 of	 being	individually	 targeted	 for	 supporting	 a	 belligerent.	 In	 Afghanistan,	 the	 Taliban	attempted	to	kill	anyone	involved	in	local	government	institutions	as	a	means	to	prevent	people	from	occupying	these	roles	(Rashid,	2010).			
Selective	post-conflict	incentives	






that	the	more	people	this	offer	is	made	to,	the	less	credible	it	becomes.	She	found	that	 as	 coalitions	 grew	 in	 size,	 less	 powerful	members	 of	 the	 coalition	would	desert	and	offer	support	elsewhere.	
	
Collective	within-conflict	incentives	




























































they	 will	 try	 to	 limit	 the	 amount	 of	 support	 their	 opponent’s	 constituent	population	can	generate.			The	 belligerent	 that	 achieves	 these	 objectives	 and	monopolises	 its	 capacity	 to	shape	population	behaviour	and	mobilise	resources	will	win	the	war.	This	mirrors	recent	practitioner	descriptions	of	civil	war.	David	Kilcullen	claims	that	“the	side	may	win	which	best	mobilizes	 (sic)	and	energizes	 (sic)	 its	global,	 regional	and	local	support	base	-	and	prevents	its	adversaries	doing	likewise”	(2012;	p140).	Figure	two	shows	this	process	visually.			
	Figure	2:	Framework	for	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition.	






The	ability	to	generate	resources	ultimately	determines	a	conflict	actors’	strength	and,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 dynamic	 process,	 I	 describe	 this	 ability	 as	 a	 belligerent’s	regenerative	capacity.	In	the	example	given	at	the	start	of	this	thesis,	the	Taliban	grew	 during	 the	 period	 of	 Western	 intervention	 in	 Afghanistan	 because	 its	regenerative	 capacity	 increased	 at	 a	 greater	 rate	 than	 it	 was	 losing	 fighters,	meaning	it	was	able	to	increase	its	strength	even	in	the	face	of	heavy	losses.		
	
War	as	a	state-building	competition	
	The	description	of	civil	war	as	a	process	of	alliance	building	offers	an	important	insight	into	the	basic	process	underpinning	the	dynamic	and	outcomes	intrastate	conflicts.	 It	 is	particularly	revealing	that	 this	description	mirrors	more	general	academic	literature	on	how	governments	maintain	control	over	the	state.					Bueno	 de	 Mesquita	 et	 al.	 present	 a	 model	 of	 society	 in	 The	 Logic	 of	 Political	


























Tilly’s	work	to	show	how	two	or	more	actors	can	exercise	de	facto	sovereignty	within	 one	 internationally	 recognised	 state	 (Kingston	 and	 Spears,	 2004;	Mampilly,	 2011;	 Pegg,	 1998;	 E.	 Wood,	 2010).	 Belligerents	 compete	 to	 build	sovereign	structures	that	deliver	incentives	that	shape	population	behaviour,	and	extract	and	organise	the	resources	and	support	this	behaviour	grants	the	conflict	actor.	They	then	use	these	sovereign	structures	to	build	and	support	a	military	force.	 A	 state	 of	 ‘multiple	 sovereignty’	 exists	when	 two	 or	more	macro-actors	achieve	this,	regardless	of	the	relative	size	of	their	forces.	Civil	wars	then	become	a	competition	between	belligerents	to	extend	these	sovereign	structures	across	the	state	and	degrade	those	of	their	opponent.	The	side	that	is	able	to	do	this	will	be	in	a	position	to	‘mobilise	and	energise	its	support-base	and	demobilise	that	of	its	opponent’	(Kilcullen,	2012).				
Conclusion		

















	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
































Insurgent	doctrine	strongly	reinforces	this	perspective.	It	basically	proposes	two	possible	 strategies;	 facilitate	 the	 complete	 fall	 of	 the	 government	 and	 assume	power,	or	eject	the	government	from	one	part	of	the	state,	fill	the	political	void	and	use	it	to	build	a	military	force	capable	of	capturing	the	remainder	of	the	polity	(Guevara,	2008;	Guillen	and	Hodges,	1973;	Mampilly,	2011;	Tse-Tung,	2002).			Either	way,	 the	 primary	 objective	 of	 rebels	 is	 to	 erode	 government	 sovereign	structures	 and	 this	 will	 form	 the	 key	 battleground	 of	 any	 civil	 war.	 For	governments,	 civil	war	 is	 about	 re-monopolising	 control	 by	 re-establishing	 its	sovereign	structures	that	manage	its	relationship	with	the	population	across	the	whole	 state.	 For	 rebels	 it	 is	 about	 further	weakening	 government	 institutions,	creating	the	space	for	the	rebels	to	extend	their	sovereign	structures	across	the	rest	of	the	polity.			








Rebels,	in	contrast,	are	not	similarly	constrained.	Insurgent	groups	do	not	need	to	carry	out	governance	or	control	territory,	 they	will	only	do	it	 if	 it	 is	 in	their	interests	to	do	so.	In	other	words,	rebel	groups	can	dedicate	all	of	their	resources	to	supporting	their	war	effort,	opting	to	reduce	or	increase	activity	as	necessary.	Insurgents	 can	 be	 large	 shadow-state	 like	 organisations,	 like	 the	 LTTE	 in	 Sri	Lanka,	or	a	small	band	of	guerrillas	 looting	rural	communities,	 like	 the	LRA	 in	Uganda	(Mampilly,	2011).	Insurgencies	have	the	flexibility	to	ensure	that	the	level	and	 type	 of	 activity	 they	 carry	 out	 reflects	 their	 ability	 to	 generate	 resources.	Governments	do	not	have	this	flexibility	as	they	are	constrained	by	the	need	to	raise	 resources	 to	 carry	 out	 activity	 not	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 civil	 war	 it	 is	fighting.		This	 demonstrates	 the	 two	 important	 caveats	 that	 need	 adding	 to	 any	understanding	of	civil	war	as	a	competition	to	mobilise	support.	In	total,	there	are	three	main	components	of	civil	war	when	the	government	remains	functional:		
• Civil	 war	 is	 a	 mobilisation	 competition,	 in	 which	 belligerents	 seek	 to	generate	 resources	 from	 their	 constituent	 population	 and	 degrade	 the	capacity	of	their	opponents	to	do	the	same.		
• Governments	 start	 with	 the	 structures	 that	 manage	 this	 mobilisation	intact.	Rebels	have	to	degrade	these	structures	before	they	can	build	their	own.		
• Governments	have	 to	mobilise	a	 certain	amount	of	 support	 to	keep	 the	state	functioning	and	hold	onto	power.			The	rest	of	this	chapter	will	show	how	understanding	these	three	elements	of	civil	war	helps	to	explain	conflict	dynamics	and	outcomes.			
Military	interaction	










































































When	the	government	can	no	longer	service	those	alliances	that	keep	it	in	power,	its	 constituent	 population	 withdraws	 its	 support	 and	 the	 government	 falls,	regardless	of	how	far	the	rebels	have	succeeded	in	pushing	the	war	through	its	various	phases.	If	the	foundation	of	government	control	is	weak	then	even	low	levels	 of	 military	 activity	 may	 undermine	 the	 government’s	 solution	 for	controlling	the	polity	and	it	will	collapse,	allowing	the	rebels	to	take	control	of	the	whole	state	even	if	they	had	a	smaller	military	force	than	the	government.		



















forces	 eventually	wore	 down	 and	 demobilised	 the	 government.20	 Importantly,	Cambodia	represents	a	more	conventional	civil	war,	while	Zimbabwe	saw	a	more	traditional	insurgency,	supporting	the	idea	that	rebels	can	win	regardless	of	the	phase	in	which	the	conflict	finds	itself.		This	is	what	Abraham	Guillen	meant	when	he	said	“in	a	revolutionary	war	that	side	wins	which	endures	the	longest:	morally,	politically	and	economically.”	(Guillen	and	Hodges,	1973;	p233).		








































in	a	strong	position.	If	these	institutions	are	breaking	apart	this	will	signal	to	both	belligerents,	and	the	population,	that	the	government	is	struggling	to	absorb	the	costs	of	the	conflict	and	that	the	rebels	are	likely	to	win.	This	leads	to	the	main	hypothesis	of	this	thesis:			Hypothesis	 1:	Governments	 that	 are	 strengthening	 institutions	 that	manage	 its	
relations	with	the	population	are	more	likely	to	survive	civil	wars,	while	rebels	that	































	Having	developed	a	framework	for	understanding	civil	war,	it	becomes	possible	to	explore	what	types	of	sovereign	relationships	enable	governments	to	fend	off	rebel	 challengers.	We	 can	 then	 generate	 sub-hypotheses	 to	 test	 alongside	 the	main	hypothesis	articulated	in	the	previous	chapter	and	measure	the	theoretical	model’s	 general	 utility.	 The	 previous	 chapter	 suggested	 that	 the	 power	 of	 a	variable	 should	 be	 determined	 primarily	 by	 the	 effect	 it	 has	 on	 government	capacity	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 the	 population.	 This	 will	 indicate	 whether	governments	are	losing	control	or	reducing	rebel	capacity	to	replace	losses	from	military	activity.		We	 can	 now	 also	 examine,	 both	 theoretically	 and	 empirically,	 the	 main	components	 of	 current	 counterinsurgency	 doctrine;	 development,	 governance	and	security	(US	Army,	2007).	Each	of	these	will	be	treated	in	turn,	and	examined	according	to	how	effectively	they	generate	resources	for	belligerents.			






In	 order	 to	 expand	 the	 discussion,	 development,	 governance	 and	 security	 are	treated	 more	 broadly	 to	 encapsulate	 three	 different	 types	 of	 incentives	belligerents	use	to	generate	support;	socioeconomic,	political	and	security.			
Socioeconomic	incentives	











































services	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 survive	 civil	 wars.	 Those	 overseeing	 a	 decline	 in	
socioeconomic	activity	are	more	likely	to	be	defeated.		
Political	incentives	






























































































fighting	a	civil	war.	The	strength	of	these	structures	determine	a	conflict	actor’s	ability	 to	 mobilise	 support	 through	 the	 course	 of	 the	 war	 and,	 therefore,	 its	regenerative	 capacity.	 Governments	 that	 extend	 their	 institutions	 across	 the	polity	will	eliminate	rebel	capacity	to	generate	support,	and	will	win	wars.	Rebels	that	undermine	these	institutions	will	defeat	incumbent	governments.	
	






I	suggest	that	violence	has	another	impact	on	the	likely	outcome	of	conflicts	that	has	not	been	previously	identified.	When	employing	violence,	a	conflict	actor	is	not	 creating	 mutually	 reinforcing	 behaviour.	 Creating	 a	 secure	 environment,	facilitating	 economic	 activity	 and	 developing	 effective	 governance	 structures	incentivises	the	population	to	generate	the	resources	–	manpower,	finances,	food	-	 that	 a	 belligerent	 can	 then	 use	 to	 sustain	 its	 military	 force.	 In	 contrast,	belligerents	often	use	violence	to	stifle	the	generation	of	these	resources	for	their	opponent.	This	explains	why	governments	can	win	through	repression	when	the	target	 population	 is	 small	 as	 it	 can	 draw	 the	 support	 it	 needs	 to	 sustain	 this	activity	from	elsewhere.	If	the	oppressed	population	is	large	then	a	government	may	bankrupt	itself	by	pursuing	this	strategy,	undermining	its	ability	to	distribute	benefits	to	its	constituent	population.			The	 case	 studies	 below	will	 offer	 an	 opportunity	 to	 explore	whether	 violence	interacts	with	 the	ability	of	belligerents	 to	mobilise	resources.	 In	other	words,	does	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 have	 secondary,	 as	 yet	 unexplored,	 effects	 on	 the	regenerative	capacity	of	belligerents.		





















community	 networks	 are	 strong,	 then	 belligerents	 will	 have	 to	 build	 support	through	them,	rather	than	building	more	impersonal	institutions	(2011;	loc656).	Lastly,	Alexander	Downes	(2007)	showed	that	the	ethnic	breakdown	of	a	country	and	how	these	social	groups	reflect	the	make-up	of	the	government	and	the	rebels	can	also	affect	conflict	behaviour.			These	variables	affect	conflict	dynamics,	precisely	because	they	determine	rebel	capacity	 to	 undermine	 government	 relations	 with	 the	 population	 and	 build	 a	militant	force.		
	
Conclusion	




















selection	process	was	independent	of	any	previous	knowledge	I	had	of	particular	wars.	As	the	case	studies	follow	from	a	large-N	study,	we	also	know	whether	the	variables	of	interest	I	examine	in	the	case	studies	correlate	to	civil	war	outcomes	across	 a	 variety	 of	 contexts.	 A	 quantitative	model,	 therefore,	 allows	 us	 to	 test	whether	the	model	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis	is	plausible	when	set	against	a	 wide	 variety	 of	 conflicts.	 Perhaps	 more	 importantly,	 it	 offers	 an	 objective	method	for	selecting	case	studies	to	explicitly	test	the	causal	processes	that	form	the	main	part	of	my	theory.			Consequently,	a	mixed	method	approach	offers	the	best	of	all	worlds,	drawing	on	the	advantages	of	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	analysis	and	allowing	me	to	test	 my	 main	 hypotheses,	 which	 revolve	 around	 how	 population	 support	determines	civil	war	outcomes.			
Quantitative	study	
	For	the	quantitative	analysis	I	use	a	dataset	adapted	from	the	RAND	study	How	






















Correlates	of	War	project,	I	also	borrow	two	variables	directly	from	Connable	and	Libicki’s	 data.	 Collecting	data	 for	 these	 independent	 variables	 on	 any	 conflicts	added	to	the	dataset	would	have	caused	exactly	the	same	problems	as	judging	the	dependent	 variable.	 On	 balance,	 therefore,	 I	 focus	 only	 on	 those	 conflicts	 that	were	included	in	Connable	and	Libicki’s	study.			The	trade-offs	for	using	this	smaller	dataset	are	also	more	than	negated	by	how	influential	Connable	and	Libicki’s	work	has	been	in	policy	circles.	Its	conclusions	and	recommendations	hold	huge	weight	as	RAND	retains	a	strong	relationship	with	 the	 US	 government	 (RAND	 Corporation,	 2014).	 Using	 RAND’s	 dataset	situates	my	conclusions	and	recommendation	within	their	findings,	which	have	helped	to	shape	Western	interventions	in	Afghanistan,	Iraq	and	Syria.			

































	The	dependent	variable	in	all	the	main	models	developed	below	is	the	civil	war’s	outcome	 as	 taken	 from	 the	 RAND	 dataset.	 Outcomes	 are	 coded	 as	 1	 for	 a	government	victory,	2	for	a	rebel	victory	or	3	for	a	mixed	outcome.	If	the	war	does	not	end	in	a	given	year	it	is	coded	as	0.	Table	seven	gives	the	basic	details	of	the	conflicts	included.			






It	 is	clear	that	there	 is	 limited	difference	 in	the	average	outcomes	of	rebel	and	government	victories.	Government	victories	do	appear	to	last	slightly	longer	than	rebel	triumphs,	but	this	difference	is	not	statistically	significant.	This	supports	the	notion	 that	 insurgent	 and	 counterinsurgent	 campaigns	 require	 a	 significant	commitment	of	time	and	resources	(Shinn,	2009).	What	it	also	suggests,	however,	is	that	neither	side	is	more	likely	to	win	long	wars.	Mixed	outcomes	are	clearly	shorter	that	outright	victories.31	This	would	be	expected	if	these	type	of	outcomes	reflect	 belligerents	 agreeing	 not	 to	 fight	 until	 one	 or	 other	 party	 collapses	completely.		
Method	
	Given	the	dependent	variable	is	nominal	rather	than	ordinal,	I	used	a	multinomial	logit	model	to	measure	the	correlation	between	the	independent	variables	and	the	various	outcomes.	The	dataset	contains	conflicts	across	51	countries	so	the	observations	 were	 clustered	 by	 country.	 I	 then	 used	 CLARIFY	 to	 simulate	 a	variety	 of	 scenarios,	 setting	 variables	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 interest.	 We	 can,	therefore,	 actually	understand	 the	 substantive	 correlation	between	 changes	 in	macro-structures	and	particular	conflict	outcomes.	CLARIFY	requires	a	positive	definite	matrix	to	run	the	simulation.	The	number	of	variables	must	be	less	than	the	number	of	clusters	divided	by	the	number	of	non-zero	outcomes,	which	in	this	case	results	in	a	maximum	of	sixteen	independent	variables.		
	
Independent	Variables	







absolute	terms,	it	enabled	‘multiple	sovereigns’	to	emerge.	The	question	is	how	further	changes	correlate	to	specific	outcomes.	The	best	way	to	capture	this	is	to	measure	changes	in	the	value	of	key	variables	from	one	year	to	the	next.	The	main	explanatory	time-varying	variables	are,	therefore,	presented	in	difference	format.	The	difference	measure	used	for	each	variable	is	based	on	how	long	it	is	judged	for	the	effect	to	be	felt	by	the	population.	Socioeconomic	and	governance	changes	are	likely	to	take	longer	to	filter	down	and	affect	population	behaviour;	as	such,	a	cumulated	 change	 over	 a	 three-year	 period	 is	 recorded.	 The	 security	environment	is	likely	to	be	felt	much	quicker,	so	two-year	changes	are	calculated.	During	the	early	years	of	the	war,	accumulated	change	is	taken	from	the	start	of	the	insurgency.			
Socioeconomic	variables	








has	more	capacity	to	deliver	economic	benefits	as	a	means	to	shape	population	behaviour.	 Any	 missing	 data	 was	 replaced	 by	 extrapolating	 changes	 in	 the	intervening	period.			
Political	Variables	






regional	or	urban-rural.	The	EPR	dataset	only	accounts	for	the	first	of	these,	but	it	proxies	for	political	concessions	more	generally.		These	political	variables	address	two	factors	of	interest;	governance	and	violence.	Increasing	democracy	will	reflect	political	reform	and	the	use	of	political	benefits	to	 influence	 the	 population.	 In	 contrast,	 declining	 democracy	 may	 signify	 a	government	 taking	more	 repressive	measures	 to	undermine	 support	 for	 rebel	groups,	possibly	to	include	the	use	of	violence.			These	variables	focus	on	the	inclusiveness	of	government	institutions	rather	than	describing	actual	government	effectiveness.	The	latter	would	better	fit	parts	of	the	theory	developed	in	earlier	chapters.	However,	data	that	covers	government	effectiveness	more	explicitly	does	not	exist	for	all	of	the	conflicts	in	the	dataset.	Nevertheless,	against	the	smaller	set	of	conflicts	it	corresponds	to,	I	have	run	two	regressions	 including	changes	 in	 the	government’s	political	reach,	 from	Kugler	and	Tamman’s	relative	political	performance	dataset	(2012).		We	would	expect	changes	in	this	variable	to	have	a	more	significant	impact	than	variables	that	measure	democracy	as	it	better	captures	the	ability	of	governments	to	both	deliver	incentives	to	and	generate	resources	from	the	population.	In	some	ways,	however,	the	role	of	democracy	is	more	interesting	theoretically	in	that	it	tests	the	central	policy	of	Western	interventions	in	many	civil	wars.			
Security	Variables	























	Aside	 from	 the	 independent	 variables	 of	 primary	 interest,	 a	 number	 of	 other	contextual	 factors	may	impact	conflict	actors’	ability	to	draw	support	 from	the	population.	The	final	section	of	chapter	three	went	over	some	of	the	key	variables	discussed	in	literature	on	civil	war.	The	list	below	represents	those	that	can	be	easily	coded	for	use	in	the	statistical	model.	Any	of	these	variables	having	a	strong	effect	on	conflict	outcomes	does	not	challenge	the	overall	theories	of	this	thesis	if	this	effect	is	in	conjunction	with	the	expected	role	of	the	independent	variables	already	outlined.	However,	if	the	model	shows	no	correlation	between	the	above	population-focused	variables	and	civil	war	outcomes,	then	this	would	represent	a	serious	challenge	to	the	main	hypothesis	of	this	thesis.		
	
Insurgency	use	of	Terror	











	Both	 quantitative	 studies	 (Connable	 and	 Libicki,	 2010;	 Salehyan,	 2007)	 and	doctrine	 writers	 (Galula,	 1964)	 discuss	 the	 value	 of	 internal	 and	 external	sanctuary	to	insurgents.			Access	 to	 an	 external	 sanctuary	 lessens	 the	 support	 rebels	 need	 to	 generate	support	 from	 the	 population	 as	 they	 do	 not	 have	 to	 live	 amongst	 local	communities	 to	 evade	 government	 forces.	 They	 can	 focus	 their	 efforts	 on	degrading	government	capacity	to	hold	its	alliances	with	the	population	together.	The	data	on	external	sanctuaries	comes	from	the	Connable	and	Libicki	dataset	and	is	a	dichotomous	variable	coded	as	one	if	the	rebels	have	access	to	an	external	sanctuary	and	zero	if	they	do	not.	Rebel	groups	had	access	to	external	sanctuaries	in	 44	 of	 the	 conflicts	 covered	 in	 the	 dataset,	 showing	 how	 common	 it	 is	 for	insurgencies	to	use	foreign	soil	to	stay	out	of	reach	of	government	forces.		
	To	proxy	for	access	to	an	internal	safe-haven	I	use	Fearon	and	Laitin’s	measure	for	 ‘rough	 terrain’,	 which	 is	 the	 logged	 percentage	 of	 the	 country	 covered	 by	mountains	(2003;	p81).	They	acknowledge	this	does	not	cover	all	types	of	terrain	that	insurgents	might	use,	such	as	jungles	or	swamps,	but	in	the	absence	of	an	all-encompassing	measure	 of	 rough	 terrain	 they	 conclude	 this	 single	 measure	 is	sufficient	(ibid.).		
Territorial	conflict	







	Military	support	for	either	side	should	affect	the	outcome	and	how	conflict	actors	seek	to	mobilise	support	from	the	population.	I	use	a	dichotomous	variable	of	one	if	a	belligerent	is	receiving	direct	external	support	in	a	given	year,	and	zero	if	they	do	not.	The	data	 is	 taken	 from	the	merged	 ‘International	Military	 Intervention	Data	1945-2005’	(Pearson	and	Baumann,	1993;	Pickering	and	Kisangani,	2009).	It	lists	all	state	military	interventions	in	other	countries,	their	duration	and	who	was	 being	 supported	 between	 1945	 and	 2005.	 The	 variable	 does	 not	 include	intervention	not	sanctioned	by	the	state	or	economic	support.			Overall,	governments	received	support	in	29	conflicts,	spread	across	131	conflict-year	observations.	Twelve	of	these	interventions	lasted	for	more	than	three	years,	while	four	lasted	the	entire	duration	of	the	conflict.	Rebels	received	support	in	20	civil	wars,	spread	across	75	conflict-years.	Of	these,	nine	interventions	lasted	for	over	three	years	and	five	were	permanent	for	the	entire	war.			
Time	







1996-1999	 for	 socioeconomic	 and	 governance	 variables	 and	 1997-1999	 for	security	variables.					
Results	
	To	 begin	with,	 I	 examine	 each	 of	 the	 tenets	 of	 counterinsurgency	 doctrine	 in	isolation,	before	bringing	them	together	and	adding	the	control	variables.			
Socioeconomic	variables		




























































Model	 three	 lends	 support	 to	 the	 second	 part	 of	 hypothesis	 three.	 It	 also	reinforces	the	results	from	model	two,	in	that	the	effect	of	changes	in	the	polity	score	and	ethnic	relations	are	robust	to	the	addition	of	the	additional	variable.	Models	 two	 and	 three,	 therefore,	 support	 hypothesis	 three	 in	 its	 totality;	governments	do	better	when	they	strengthen	their	institutions	of	governments,	while	they	are	more	likely	to	lose	if	these	institutions	are	weakening.			
Security	conditions	









































government’s	 capacity	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 the	 population.	 That	 the	 key	variables	 continue	 to	 perform	 exactly	 as	 expected	 shows	 the	 utility	 of	 this	approach	 for	 examining	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 main	 tenets	 of	 counterinsurgency	doctrine	and	how	they	 interact	with	the	broader	geopolitical	and	geographical	context.	 It	 also	 demonstrates	 the	 model’s	 utility	 for	 selecting	 case	 studies	 to	examine	 whether	 the	 hypothesised	 causal	 mechanisms	 lead	 to	 the	 various	outcomes.				Using	model	six,	we	can	now	simulate	a	number	of	situations	to	see	how	the	key	explanatory	variables	of	principle	interest	interact	with	the	broader	contextual	variables.			
	
Socioeconomic	conditions	








	Simulating	potential	outcomes	of	interest	lends	further	support	to	the	power	of	political	reform	in	bringing	conflicts	to	an	end.	An	improvement	in	the	societal	position	of	social	groups	associated	with	the	rebels	and	a	rise	in	the	polity	score	by	 five	 increase	 the	probability	of	a	mixed	outcome	by	as	much	as	42	percent	depending	on	how	we	set	other	variables.39	While	changes	in	the	polity	score	have	a	relatively	small	substantive	effect	by	themselves,	they	do	interact	heavily	with	other	variables,	suggesting	political	reform	needs	to	be	made	at	the	right	time	in	the	conflict.			The	 power	 of	 democratisation	 as	 a	 means	 to	 bring	 civil	 war	 to	 an	 end	 is	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	there	does	not	appear	to	be	a	simulation	in	which	the	probability	of	a	mixed	outcome	climbs	above	approximately	nineteen	percent	without	any	political	reform.40	Moreover,	political	reform	also	seems	to	correlate	with	 governments	 getting	 themselves	 out	 of	 trouble.	 If	 variables,	 including	 a	decline	in	GDP	and	life	expectancy,	are	set	in	favour	of	rebels	then	political	reform	significantly	 reduces	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 rebel	 victory	 and	 increases	 the	likelihood	of	a	mixed	outcome.	This	suggests	that	the	economy	acts	as	an	early	warning	system	for	governments.	If	it	is	declining,	then	governments	can	react	by	increasing	political	incentives	to	undercut	rebel	capacity	to	operate.			







independent	 variables	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 rebel	 victory	 then	 a	 drop	 in	 the	 size	 of	government	forces	by	50	per	1000	people	in	the	population	increases	the	chance	of	 a	 rebel	 victory	 by	 14	 percent.41	 Setting	 the	 variables	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 mixed	outcome	 and	 simulating	 a	 decline	 in	 government	 forces	 by	 the	 same	 amount	increases	a	mixed	outcome	by	12	percent,42	but	has	no	effect	on	a	rebel	victory.	Governments	 that	 are	 struggling	 to	mobilise	 their	 army	 and	 provide	 security	appear,	therefore,	to	have	two	choices;	slide	into	defeat	or	broaden	the	segment	of	the	population	it	offers	benefits	to,	undermining	rebel	capacity	to	regenerate.		
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50%	 True	positive	 0	(0)	 0.07	(1)	 0.17	(3)	False	positive	 0	(0)	 0.00	(1)	 0	(0)	40%	 True	positive	 0	(0)	 0.14	(2)	 0.17	(3)	False	positive	 0	(0)	 0.00	(2)	 0	(0)	30%	 True	positive	 0	(0)	 0.36	(5)	 0.17	(3)	False	positive	 0	(0)	 0.00	(2)	 0.00	(1)	20%	 True	positive	 0	(0)	 0.5	(7)	 0.28	(5)	False	positive	 0.00	(2)	 0.00	(7)	 0.01	(5)	10%	 True	positive	 0.39	(7)	 0.57	(8)	 0.39	(7)	False	positive	 0.03	(26)	 0.02	(15)	 0.03	(22)	Table	15:	Number	of	true	and	false	positives	at	different	thresholds.	














Pred.	 Rebel	victories	 Pred.	 Mixed	
outcomes	
Pred.	Uruguay	 0.179	 Cambodia	 0.717	 Burundi	 0.776	Angola	(UNITA)	 0.175	 Rwanda	 0.481	 Chechnya	I	 0.77	Argentina	 0.161	 South	Africa	 0.343	 Georgia/	Abkhazia	 0.661	Congo/Katanga	 0.129	 Eritrea	 0.322	 Mozambique	(RENAMO)	 0.284	Iraq	Kurdistan	 0.108	 South	Vietnam	 0.258	 Bosnia	 0.216	Northern	Ireland	 0.103	 Afghanistan	(anti-Soviet)	 0.224	 Nicaragua	(Contras)	 0.113	Sierra	Leone	 0.1	 Afghanistan	(post-Soviet)	 0.151	 Lebanese	Civil	War	 0.106	Biafran	Secession	 0.093	 Sudan	(SPLA)	 0.095	 Congo	(anti-Kabila)	 0.086	Philippines	 0.083	 Namibia	 0.072	 East	Timor	 0.082	Guatemala	 0.055	 Somalia	 0.048	 Senegal	 0.068	Balochistan	 0.038	 Liberia	 0.023	 Papua	New	Guinea	 0.042	Indonesia	(Aceh)	 0.032	 Afghanistan	(Taliban)	 0.017	 Yemen	 0.038	Turkey	(PKK)	 0.019	 Zimbabwe	 0.008	 Tajikistan	 0.035	Croatia	 0.016	 Moldova	 0.000	 Nagorno-
Karabakh	
0.028	Morocco	 0.01	 	 	 El	Salvador	 0.023	Algeria	(GIA)	 0.009	 	 	 Nepal	 0.017	Uganda	(ADF)	 0.006	 	 	 Kosovo	 0.017	Peru	 0.004	 	 	 Kampuchea	 0.002	Table	16:	Predicted	probabilities	at	time	of	war	ending.	
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a	 changing	 political	 context	 affects	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 population	 to	 provide	support	to	belligerents,	while	the	military	situation	holds	relatively	constant.	Of	particular	 interest	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	CNDD-FDD	played	no	role	 in	 the	Arusha	Accords.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 ultimately	 adhered	 to	 the	 Accords’	 principle	components	 because	 it	 affected	 the	 behaviour	 of	 its	 support-base.	 We	 can,	therefore,	directly	trace	how	this	happened,	without	concerns	that	the	political	deal	was	shaped	by	the	rebels	to	strengthen	their	own	power.	It	also	serves	as	an	important	lesson	to	policymakers	working	on	civil	wars;	political	solutions	can	be	 effective	 at	 undermining	 rebel	 support	 even	 if	 rebels	 are	 not	 involved	 in	drawing	them	up.			
Key	actors	









	The	 rest	 of	 the	 chapter	 will	 look	 at	 how	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 and	 FAB	 sought	 to	generate	support	from	the	two	different	segments	of	the	population.	The	rebels	drew	almost	all	of	their	support	from	the	Hutus,	who	made	up	85	percent	of	the	population.	The	government	generated	most	of	its	support	from	the	Tutsis	who	made	up	 the	remainder.49	 	 I	examine	 the	conflict	actors’	behaviour	before	and	after	2001	and	how	this	shaped	population	behaviour	during	these	two	phases.	I	will	then	look	at	the	nature	of	military	interaction	between	the	government	and	the	rebels.	Finally,	I	take	the	opportunity	to	look	at	how	external	factors	shaped	the	behaviour	of	the	conflict	actors	and	their	ability	to	generate	support	from	the	population.			As	expected,	this	chapter	offers	strong	support	for	the	theories	underpinning	this	thesis.	The	Arusha	Accords	did	threaten	to	demobilise	the	CNDD-FDD	exactly	as	predicted,	pushing	it	to	engage	in	the	fledgling	political	process.	Moreover,	there	is	strong	evidence	that	economic	difficulties	nearly	caused	the	complete	downfall	of	the	government,	forcing	it	into	the	political	reforms	that	ended	the	war,	exactly	as	we	would	expect	based	on	the	analysis	in	the	previous	chapters.			
The	state	before	1993			
A	history	of	violence	













After	1972,	the	Hutu	political	opposition	organised	itself	abroad.	Paliphetu	(who	would	later	become	the	FNL)	spent	twenty	years	in	exile	organising	politically,	spreading	their	message	both	domestically	and	internationally	(Watt,	2008).	At	the	same	time	a	Hutu	middle	class	began	to	re-emerge	(Watt,	2008).	Frodebu	had	also	grown	in	strength,	as	evidenced	by	its	victory	in	the	1993	elections.	The	Tutsi	military,	therefore,	clearly	faced	a	much	more	organised	threat	than	in	1972	and	it	 possibly	 recognised	 that	 controlling	 the	 population	 through	 violence	 may	empower	this	opposition	even	further.		
The	outbreak	of	war	





















of	the	CNDD-FDD	show	how	effective	governance	can	be	turned	into	a	within-war	incentive	if	it	provides	the	population	with	direct	benefits.			The	 rebels	 were	 also	 not	 averse	 to	 using	 violence	 against	 Hutus	 when	 they	considered	it	expedient.	For	example,	they	tried	to	leverage	traditional	structures	of	Burundian	society,	such	as	the	bashingantahe.	These	were	men,	“selected	on	the	basis	of	their	wisdom,	impartiality	and	wealth”	(Uvin,	2008;	p4),	who	advised	communities	 and	 mediated	 local	 disputes.	 Peter	 Uvin	 argues	 they	 remain	extremely	influential	in	shaping	popular	perceptions	of	national	political	actors	(2008).	The	CNDD-FDD,	however,	could	not	co-opt	the	bashingantahe	and	killed	those	that	refused	to	offer	support	(Huyse	and	Salter,	2008).	Reports	examining	the	 strength	 of	 the	 bashingantahe	 suggest	 CNDD-FDD	 violence	 significantly	weakened	 the	 institution,	 eliminating	 a	 potential	 barrier	 the	 rebels	 faced	 in	shaping	population	behaviour	(ibid.).			
Popular	support	for	the	CNDD-FDD	













Regardless	of	all	these	caveats,	the	rebels	shaped	population	behaviour	to	such	an	extent	that	they	were	able	to	continually	regenerate	resources	expended	on	military	activity	against	the	government.	Tanzania	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	 Congo	 provided	 assistance	 and	 sanctuary	 to	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 (International	Crisis	 Group,	 2006).	 However,	 according	 to	 some	 commentators,	 the	 Hutu	population	provided	the	CNDD-FDD	with	a	level	of	support	that	made	it	almost	self-sufficient	(Nindonera,	2012).	The	effectiveness	of	the	CNDD-FDD’s	sovereign	structures	 shows	 the	 tangible	 value	 rebels	 can	 accrue	 from	 building	 relations	with	the	population,	and	reinforces	why	conflict	actors	divert	so	much	attention	to	these	types	of	activities.		
Targeting	non-constituents	
















rebellion	 than	at	 any	 stage	 in	 the	 last	 thirty	years,	 the	CNDD-FDD	was	able	 to	demonstrate	this	disparity	to	the	population	through	its	political	networks.	The	Hutu	 population	 simply	 did	 not	 believe	 that	 Hutu	 politicians	 had	 any	 power	(Nindonera,	2012).	The	front-government	installed	by	the	FAB,	therefore,	had	a	negligible	impact	on	rebel	strength.	By	1996,	the	FAB	feared	the	weakness	of	the	government	would	prompt	an	international	intervention	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	As	it	had	also	failed	as	a	strategy	for	demobilising	support	for	the	CNDD-FDD,	the	FAB	reinstalled	Pierre	Buyoya	as	president.		Some	Hutus	were	brought	into	the	army,	due	to	the	need	to	quickly	expand	its	size	 (Nindonera,	 2012).	 However,	 Hutus	 remained	 subordinate	 to	 Tutsi	commanders	 and	 their	 overall	 role	was	 limited.	Hutu	 communities,	 under	 the	Guardians	of	the	Peace	program,	were	given	light	weapons,	a	little	training	and	then	used	on	the	 front	 lines	 to	 fight	rebels	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2001a).	The	government	claimed	that	the	population	engaged	with	the	process	as	a	means	to	gain	 security	 (Human	Rights	Watch,	2001b).	However,	 a	Human	Rights	Watch	report	 (2001b)	 suggests	 that	 the	 FAB	 forced	 many	 people	 to	 participate.	Communities	that	refused	to	join	were	treated	as	if	they	supported	the	insurgents	and	given	 fines	and	 imprisoned	(p6).	Former	rebels	were	also	recruited,	often	facing	being	tortured	if	they	refused.	As	many	as	75	percent	of	these	militias	in	some	areas	were	reported	 to	be	 former	rebels	 (p8).	The	government	did	offer	some	direct	incentives	to	those	that	joined	these	militias.	It	did	not	pay	them,	but	it	provided	medical	care	for	both	fighters	and	their	families	(p9).	The	FAB	also	allowed	 recruits	 to	 loot	 and	 enrich	 themselves	 when	 they	 operated	 in	 areas	accused	of	supporting	the	rebels	(p10).	Reports	documenting	the	activities	of	the	Guardians	 of	 the	 Peace,	 however,	 suggest	 the	 primary	 motivation	 most	individuals	had	 for	 joining	 the	program	was	 to	avoid	government	punishment	(Human	Rights	Watch,	2001a,	2001b).		
The	same	old	violence	












were	set	up,	insurgents	would	simply	blend	into	the	population	as	soon	as	any	FAB	 troops	arrived.	Once	 they	used	 the	 camps	 they	eliminated	 this	option	 for	rebel	soldiers	(p40).	In	addition,	the	population	could	not	provide	the	material,	financial	and	manpower	support	outlined	above.	If	there	was	no	population	the	rebels	could	not	create	the	sovereign	structures	they	used	to	generate	the	support	that	 allowed	 them	 to	 replace	 personnel	 and	 resources	 expended	 on	 the	battlefield.	Statements	by	some	members	of	the	FAB	affirm	that	the	aim	of	the	camps	was	to	"isolate	the	FDD,	to	limit	the	ability	of	the	Hutu	population	in	rural	areas	 to	 offer	 support	 to	 the	FDD	and	other	Hutu	 rebel	 groups,	 and	bring	 the	population	under	the	strict	scrutiny	and	control	of	the	military"	(p42).			






support	from	the	Tutsi	population.	Tutsi	support	for	the	FAB	was	predicated	on	two	 things;	 protection	 from	 rebel	 violence	 (Human	Rights	Watch,	 2001b),	 but	also	 direct	 payments	 for	 joining	 the	 military	 and	 civil	 service	 (Southall	 and	Bentley,	2005).	The	side	effect	of	moving	the	population	into	camps	as	a	means	to	provide	 security	 was	 that	 rural	 production	 virtually	 came	 to	 a	 standstill.	Burundi’s	economy	went	into	serious	decline	and	the	government	began	to	have	difficulties	paying	the	military	and	civil	service	(Krueger	and	Krueger,	2007).	The	FAB	 was	 also	 under	 international	 sanctions	 given	 its	 treatment	 of	 the	 Hutu	population,	 which	 meant	 it	 could	 not	 replenish	 its	 coffers	 through	 external	support	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).			This	 highlights	 the	 choice	 governments	 face	 when	 employing	 violence	 to	demobilise	their	opponents.	In	Burundi,	Hutus	represented	a	significant	majority,	suggesting	violence	as	a	strategy	should	be	unsustainable	(Downes,	2007),	and	so	it	proved	to	be	the	case.	The	FAB	was	in	danger	of	no	longer	being	able	to	provide	selective	within-war	incentives	to	the	Tutsi	population	to	staff	the	military	and	the	civil	service.	Losing	the	ability	to	do	this	would	almost	certainly	 lead	to	 its	collapse	and	a	rebel	victory,	even	though	the	rebels	were	failing	to	make	military	gains.	The	government	needed	international	sanctions	lifted,	but	this	came	with	conditions;	the	FAB	had	to	pursue	political	reform.			
The	Arusha	Accords	–	shifting	the	game	













external	sanctuary	in	Tanzania	and	control	over	peripheral	parts	of	the	country.	The	government	had	to	adhere	to	the	political	strategy	outlined	in	the	Accords	if	it	was	to	pursue	alternative	means	to	demobilise	the	CNDD-FDD.			The	 Arusha	 Accords	 also	 addressed	 the	 concerns	 of	 the	 Tutsi	 population,	ensuring	spoilers	did	not	scupper	the	deal.	Multiple	scholars	agree	that	this	was	one	 of	 the	 keys	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Arusha	 Accords	 (Cheeseman,	 2011;	Reyntjens,	 2006;	 Sullivan,	 2005).	 David	 Sullivan	 (2005)	 shows	 that	 when	 the	Hutu	government	tried	to	reform	the	security	sector	in	1993	it	could	not	credibly	convince	Tutsis	that	it	did	not	intend	to	use	the	military	to	persecute	the	Tutsi	population.	 The	 FAB	 then	 came	 under	 pressure	 to	 depose	 the	 Hutu-led	government.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Arusha	 Accords	 guaranteed	 the	 Tutsis	 retained	representation	 in	 state	 structures,	 including	 security	 organs	 (ibid.).	 Nic	Cheeseman	 argues	 this	 made	 the	 Tutsis	 more	 cohesive	 as	 a	 political-bloc,	undermining	the	voice	of	hardliners	that	had	deposed	the	government	in	1993	(2011).	Credible	security	guarantees	and	the	offer	of	political	representation	was	enough	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 Tutsi	 elites	 and	 population	 supported	 the	 political	reforms.			
Demobilising	the	rebels	

















































This	pressure	explains	why	the	CNDD-FDD	made	significant	concessions	in	2003,	when	in	2001	it	had	been	determined	to	keep	fighting.	Political	reform	had	the	exact	effect	predicted	by	the	theories	underpinning	this	thesis.	It	undermined	the	ability	 of	 the	CNDD-FDD	 to	 generate	 the	 support	 it	 needed	 to	 sustain	military	activity.	As	it	was	losing	the	ability	to	generate	population	support	and	recognised	the	government	was	now	secure,	having	had	economic	sanctions	removed,	 the	CNDD-FDD	 clearly	 felt	 it	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 take	 the	 political	 deal	 it	 had	previously	rejected.	The	civil	war	came	to	an	end.				
Battlefield	dynamics	






Similarly,	 the	 government	 almost	 exclusively	 used	 its	military	 forces	 to	 shape	population	behaviour,	rather	than	demobilise	the	CNDD-FDD	directly.	When	this	tactic	 led	 to	 the	 economic	 pressure	 that	 meant	 it	 was	 struggling	 to	 mobilise	support	 from	 its	 constituent	 population,	 it	was	 forced	 into	 political	 reform	 in	exchange	for	the	ending	of	international	sanctions.			It	is	clear	that	in	Burundi,	belligerent	perceptions	about	the	progress	of	the	war	were	 shaped	 by	 changes	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	 generate	 population	 support	 as	predicted	in	chapter	two.			
	
Post-2003	
	While	 this	 thesis	 is	 primarily	 concerned	with	 how	 the	war	 in	 Burundi	 ended,	rather	than	how	peace	was	maintained,	the	issues	that	threatened	to	derail	the	political	transition	are	also	illuminating.		
	
Preparing	for	elections	







to	have	expected	some	mistrust	after	years	of	the	Tutsi	military	backtracking	on	promises	of	political	reform	(Nindonera,	2012).	This	mistrust	manifested	itself	first	 and	 foremost	 in	 a	 reluctance	 by	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 to	 disband	 its	 political	structures	rather	than	its	military	forces	(Uvin,	2008).			Most	commentators	have	pointed	out	 that	 the	CNDD-FDD’s	political	structures	allowed	it	to	mobilise	electoral	support	(Lemarchand,	2009;	Southall	and	Bentley,	2005;	Uvin,	2008).	It	would	also	clearly	give	them	the	option	of	relaunching	the	insurgency	 if	 the	FAB	did	exploit	 the	political	process	 to	 eliminate	CNDD-FDD	political	 leaders.	 To	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 these	 political	 networks	 allowed	 them	 to	mobilise	support	as	necessary,	be	it	for	elections	or	military	activity,	and	this	was	the	basis	of	the	CNDD-FDD’s	power.			The	CNDD-FDD	was	so	successful	on	this	front	that	interim	President	Ndayizeze	considered	 delaying	 the	 elections	 (Reyntjens,	 2006).	He	 tried	 to	 speed	 up	 the	demobilisation	process	and	slowed	the	appointment	of	regional	political	officials	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	He	also	tried	to	prevent	refugees	from	returning	in	time	to	vote	(ibid.).	The	CNDD-FDD	threatened	to	quit	the	process	at	this	point,	but	 even	 went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 cite	 that	 security	 considerations	 were	 proceeding	smoothly,	 to	 include	military	 integration.	 However,	 they	 considered	 delays	 in	appointing	regional	officials	a	threat	to	transition	as	it	limited	their	links	to	the	population	(Southall	and	Bentley,	2005).	Ultimately	Ndayizeze	was	not	powerful	enough	to	make	a	play	for	power	by	himself	and	ceded	to	CNDD-FDD	demands.	Even	during	the	political	transition,	the	conflict	continued	to	be	fought	through	the	population.	Both	sides	recognised	that	the	key	to	their	power	was	the	political	structures	they	used	to	generate	support	from	the	population.		
	
Democracy…	or	not?	

















could	launch	attacks	(Dilworth,	2006).	It	is	difficult	to	measure	the	value	of	this	support,	but	it	almost	certainly	acted	as	a	significant	force	multiplier.	What	it	did	not	do,	however,	was	shift	 their	 focus	away	 from	generating	support	 from	the	population	 through	 creating	 sovereign	 structures	 that	 provided	 economic	 and	political	incentives	to	the	population.	Beardsley	and	McQuinn’s	finding	that	rebels	with	 significant	 external	 support	 are	 more	 prone	 to	 violence	 as	 a	 means	 of	drawing	support	from	the	population	(2009)	does	not	appear	to	find	support	in	Burundi.	 Nor	 does	 it	 appear	 that	 external	 pressure	 pushed	 the	 rebels	 into	agreeing	 to	 a	 ceasefire	 and	participating	 in	 the	political	 process.	 Tanzania	 did	withdraw	 its	 support	 for	 the	 CNDD-FDD	 shortly	 before	 it	 chose	 to	 negotiate	(Watt,	 2008).	 However,	 this	 external	 support	was	 replaced	 following	 regional	tension	involving	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	and	Rwanda,	which	meant	rebel	groups	across	the	region	could	still	access	arms	and	supplies	as	required	(International	Crisis	Group,	2006).		
	
Personalities	
























































interaction	and	explore	what	 factors	affected	 the	conflict	 strategies	of	 the	 two	belligerents.			
1967	–	the	beginning	of	the	conflict	
	






did	 not	 necessarily	 recognise	 this,	 and	 despite	 the	 falling	 price	 in	 rice,	 most	peasants	 made	 up	 the	 difference	 selling	 rice	 across	 the	 border	 to	 North	Vietnamese	 forces	 fighting	 in	South	Vietnam	(Heder,	1979).	The	Khmer	Rouge	themselves	lamented	this	feature	of	Cambodian	society.	The	official	history	of	the	Khmer	 Rouge	 points	 to	 this	 as	 a	 time	 of	 consolidation	 and	 creating	 internal	cohesion.	 In	 practice,	 this	 translated	 into	 developing	 clandestine	 political	networks	 in	 villages	 across	 rural	 Cambodia	 (Communist	 Party	 of	 Kampuchea,	Eastern	Region	Military	Political	Service,	1973).		
1966	–	the	rise	of	the	right	
















The	new	government’s	political	and	economic	policy	also	further	disenfranchised	segments	of	the	rural	population.	Lon	Nol	tried	to	improve	the	effectiveness	of	local	government	institutions	but	as	a	means	to	aid	in	suppressing	opposition,	not	as	 an	 alternative	 to	 potential	 rebel	 supporters.	 Outposts	 were	 established	 in	isolated	regions	to	enforce	the	rice	collection	policy	and	prevent	peasants	from	trading	with	North	Vietnamese	forces	(Kiernan,	2004).	The	government	replaced	civilian	administrators	with	military	 figures	 in	areas	afflicted	by	violence,	who	then	employed	their	forces	in	destroying	communities	suspected	of	supporting	rebellious	activity	(Kiernan,	2004).			For	Lon	Nol,	the	rural	population	was	of	secondary	concern.	Parliament’s	main	aim	was	 to	 signal	 to	 the	 urban	 population	 that	 it	 was	 addressing	 corruption,	reforming	 the	 economy	 and	 protecting	 the	 urban	 population	 from	 left-wing	violence	 (Tully,	 2010).	 The	 rebels	were	 still	 extremely	weak	 at	 this	 stage	 and	parliament	remained	well	supported	in	urban	areas	throughout	the	initial	phases	of	the	conflict.					
Sihanouk’s	counterinsurgency	
	In	contrast	to	parliament,	Sihanouk	continued	his	attempts	to	balance	Cambodia’s	political	 forces.	He	gave	 the	Sangkum	a	 free	hand	 to	pursue	 its	violence-based	approach	to	undermining	support	for	the	Khmer	Rouge.	However,	he	also	tried	to	motivate	popular	support	in	rural	areas	through	a	combination	of	political	and	economic	incentives	(Henderson	and	Pike,	1971).	He	visited	afflicted	areas	and	provided	 the	 population	 with	 food,	 clothing	 and	 promised	 to	 build	 roads	(Kiernan,	 2004).	 He	 also	 raised	 counter-protests	 across	 the	 country.	 These	stymied	 rebel	 efforts	 to	 build	 support	 in	many	 areas	 as	 it	 signalled	 just	 how	popular	and	powerful	Sihanouk	remained	(Kiernan,	1982c).		
The	Khmer	Rouge	build	a	movement	












sustainable	 government	 strategy	 and	 would	 create	 further	 mobilisation	opportunities	for	the	Khmer	Rouge.			
The	Khmer	Rouge	almost	surrender	















economic	 policies	 (2003;	 p12).	 Perhaps	 the	most	 significant	 change	 the	 coup	effected	from	a	population	perspective	was	the	transition	from	active	to	passive	support	for	the	government	amongst	the	peasantry.	In	1967,	Sihanouk	organised	significant	counter-protests	against	Khmer	Rouge	activity.	In	contrast	the	Khmer	Republic	 government	 had	 no	 such	 ability,	 despite	 the	 passive	 support	 it	 is	reported	 to	 have	 enjoyed	 (Heder,	 1979).	 The	 government	 was,	 in	 effect,	demobilised	in	rural	areas	without	Sihanouk’s	influence	over	the	region,	giving	the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 greater	 freedom	 of	 movement	 and	 space	 to	 mobilise	 more	potential	support.			
	Figure	18:	Balance	of	power	in	Cambodia	conflict.	Numbers	compiled	from	various	sources	(Kiernan,	1982a;	Henderson	and	Pike,	1971;	Sutsakhan,	1978).		
Cambodia’s	war	goes	international	

























offensives	 by	 Khmer	 Republic	 forces.	 The	 war	 largely	 settled	 into	 a	 military	stalemate	for	three	years	before	these	external	backers	withdrew	the	bulk	of	their	military	support.	Historians	and	policymakers	debate	the	relative	importance	of	this	 intervention	 (Etcheson,	1984).53	However,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 it	 represented	a	three-year	period	of	 stasis	 in	 the	 fight	between	 the	 indigenous	participants.	 It	gave	them	the	chance	to	build	sovereign	relations	with	the	population	with	a	large	weight	of	the	military	burden	borne	by	their	external	supporter.			Immediately	after	the	intervention	commentators	assessed	that	the	Khmer	Rouge	represented	 only	 a	minor	 threat	 to	 the	 government	 (Brown,	 1972;	 Osbourne,	1972).		The	government	had	superior	force	numbers	(Sutsakhan,	1978)	and	more	popular	support	(Heder,	1979).	Yet,	when	the	US	and	North	Vietnam	withdrew	their	support	in	1973,	it	took	just	two	years	for	the	Khmer	Rouge	to	overcome	a	significantly	 larger	 government	 force.	 The	 explanation	 for	 this	 lies	 in	 the	difference	 between	 rebel	 and	 government	 behaviour	 towards	 the	 population	under	 the	 protection	 of	 their	 external	 backer.	 The	 Khmer	 Rouge	 developed	integrated	 political	 structures	 that	 generated	 support	 from	 the	 population.	 In	contrast,	the	Khmer	Republic	oversaw	a	humanitarian	catastrophe,	undermining	its	capacity	to	sustain	its	military	forces.	The	government	collapsed	and	the	rebels	captured	the	state.			
The	rural	population		
	







support	(Brown,	1972).	There	were	explicit	instructions	from	Hanoi	to	treat	the	population	well.	They	held	 local	elections,	making	sure	 that	 local	people	stood	and	won.	They	provided	services	to	the	population.	Moreover,	they	protected	the	population	 from	 South	 Vietnamese	 and	 government	 violence	 (Kiernan,	 2004).	The	rational	choice	for	the	population	became	to	stay	in	these	zones	and	afford	its	support	to	the	North	Vietnamese	and	the	Khmer	Rouge.	The	North	Vietnamese	recognised	they	could	not	stay	in	Cambodia	forever,	nor	did	it	serve	them	to	do	so.	The	logical	step	was,	therefore,	to	hand	over	governance	to	their	Cambodian	allies	(Etcheson,	1984).	With	government	forces	powerless	to	reclaim	territory	from	 the	 North	 Vietnamese,	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	 was	 free	 to	 build	 sovereign	structures	with	significant	swathes	of	the	population.	
	
The	Khmer	Rouge	reorganises	society	












By	developing	this	political	structure	and	using	indoctrination,	the	Khmer	Rouge	monopolised	sovereignty	over	the	population.	Appointing	loyal	leaders,	isolating	villages	and	collectively	punishing	dissent	allowed	the	Khmer	Rouge	to	control	the	information	that	informed	population	behaviour.	It	was	then	able	to	control	the	 delivery	 of	 security,	 socioeconomic	 and	 violence	 based	 incentives	 to	 the	population	as	a	means	of	drawing	the	support	it	needed	to	man,	feed	and	supply	its	military.	Using	the	support	afforded	 it	by	the	North	Vietnamese,	 the	Khmer	Rouge	created	social	structures	that	were	tailor-made	to	support	is	military	goals.	This	contrasts	it	with	most	groups	that	have	to	rely	on	building	support	through	pre-existing	social	networks.			














latter’s	ability	to	remain	a	passive	participant	in	the	conflict.	When	it	captured	a	population	centre	they	killed	government	workers	then	evacuated	the	population	to	 communist-held	 areas	 (Kiernan,	 2004).	 The	 rebels	 would	 then	 simply	surrender	 the	 town	 back	 to	 government	 forces,	 demonstrating	 how	 they	considered	populations	to	be	more	important	than	territory.	As	Ben	Kiernan	has	observed,	 this	 relocation	 took	 families	 away	 from	 their	 traditional	 support	networks,	which,	in	turn,	made	the	population	further	reliant	on	the	Khmer	Rouge	(1982b;	p279).	Pol	Pot	himself,	 in	an	interview	with	Yugoslavian	journalists	 in	1978,	described	the	intent	of	the	evacuations	as	limiting	interaction	between	the	population	and	the	government	(Department	of	Press	and	Information.	Ministry	of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Democratic	 Kampuchea,	 1978).	 Once	 they	 evacuated	 the	population,	the	Khmer	Rouge	organised	it	into	the	societal	structures	described	above	and	forced	it	to	participate	in	collective	farms,	ensuring	they	contributed	to	the	strength	of	the	Khmer	Rouge.	As	these	structures	absorbed	more	people,	the	sovereign	power	of	the	rebels	grew	ever	stronger,	allowing	them	to	create	a	more	resilient	military	force.							
Lon	Nol’s	mysticism	














































result	 was	 mass	 starvation	 in	 Phnom	 Penh	 and	 other	 urban	 centres	 and	 the	descent	into	poverty	of	the	whole	population	barring	political	elites.			The	government	became	totally	reliant	on	humanitarian	aid	and	external	support	to	sustain	its	military.	Aid,	however,	rarely	reached	its	intended	targets	and	its	only	real	effect	on	the	conflict	was	that	it	helped	sustain	corruption	(Shawcross,	1979).			
Anaemic	military	force	












A	group	of	army	generals	tried	to	recover	the	situation	by	deposing	Lon	Nol	in	April	1975	(Sutsakhan,	1978).	However,	the	US	announced	a	final	end	to	any	aid	after	the	coup	and	many	people	 in	the	army	and	civil	service	stopped	working	altogether.	 The	 new	 government	 originally	 thought	 it	 could	 still	 win	 the	 war	based	 on	 the	 military	 situation,	 but	 it	 found	 it	 had	 no	 capacity	 to	 build	 that	military	in	the	first	place	(Sutsakhan,	1978).	The	government	ceased	to	function,	surrendered,	and	the	Khmer	Rouge	strolled	 into	the	Phnom	Penh,	winning	the	war.			Despite	being	the	end	of	the	conflict,	most	observers	seem	to	agree	that	the	war	itself	was	not	the	key	factor	in	bringing	down	the	Khmer	Republic.	Craig	Etcheson,	for	example,	states	it	is	likely	“it	would	have	ended	the	same	way	for	the	Khmer	Republic	with	 or	without	 the	Khmer	Rouge”	 (1984;	 p129).	 This	 demonstrates	how	the	key	variable	in	determining	any	war	is	the	mobilisation	capacity	of	the	government,	borne	out	through	its	ability	to	shape	population	behaviour.	If	the	government	 loses	 this	 capacity,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 it	 is	 a	 result	 of	 rebel	activity,	it	will	lose	the	war.			






in	 size	 during	 this	 period	 as	 they	 developed	 resilient	 relationships	 with	 the	population.			Even	after	1970,	the	Khmer	Rouge	was	heavily	outnumbered	(see	figure	18).	The	Khmer	Rouge	used	guerrilla	tactics	to	mitigate	its	numerical	disadvantage.	During	conventional	 battles,	 guerrilla	 fighters	 struck	 population	 zones	 behind	government	 lines.	 This	 created	 the	 perception	 that	 Khmer	 Rouge	 forces	were	stronger	than	they	actually	were	and	forced	the	government	to	redirect	troops	to	these	 areas,	 straining	 its	 capacity	 to	 mobilise	 enough	 troops	 to	 secure	 the	population		(Etcheson,	1984).			Government	forces	did	perform	badly	on	the	battlefield,	despite	their	numerical	advantage.	 For	 one	 they	 put	 up	 no	 resistance	 against	 North	 Vietnamese	encroachments	(Quinn,	1976).	Major	offensives	such	as	the	two	Chenla	offensives	early	in	the	war	brought	little	to	no	gains	(Etcheson,	1984).	However,	the	Khmer	Rouge	also	showed	extreme	military	naivety.	They	chose	to	attempt	to	capture	Phnom	Penh	in	1973	under	a	barrage	of	US	bombing,	even	though	they	knew	US	military	support	for	the	Khmer	Republic	would	end	in	a	few	months	(Etcheson,	1984).	All	told	the	Khmer	Rouge	lost	significantly	more	troops	during	the	conflict	than	government	forces	(Becker,	1998).	Some	reports	suggest	the	Khmer	Rouge	could	lose	25	percent	of	its	force	in	one	offensive,	a	figure	that	military	strategists	state	 should	 be	 devastating	 to	 morale	 and	 cause	 widespread	 desertion	(Shawcross,	1979;	p298).	The	Khmer	Rouge	appeared	comfortable	with	this	as	their	mobilisation	 structures	were	 strong	 enough	 to	 continually	 replace	 these	losses.	Overall,	the	battle	lines	changed	very	little	until	the	final	months	of	the	war	and	met	all	the	criteria	for	a	military	stalemate	(Etcheson,	1984).	Under	the	cover	of	 this	 stalemate,	 the	 rebels	 created	 a	 resilient	 political	 structure,	 while	 the	government	imploded.	The	Khmer	Rouge	were	then	able	to	ultimately	take	the	capital	unimpeded.		






government	control	across	large	parts	of	the	country.	The	Khmer	Rouge	used	this	context	 to	 build	 more	 resilient	 sovereign	 structures.	 The	 transition	 from	insurgent	activity	to	conventional	style	warfare	on	the	part	of	the	Khmer	Rouge	was	 clearly	 determined	 by	 its	 mobilisation	 capacity	 and	 ability	 to	 replace	personnel	 and	 resources	 lost	 during	military	 activity.	 Once	 the	 Khmer	 Rouge	switched	 to	 a	 more	 conventional	 approach,	 however,	 it	 continued	 to	 use	 its	military	 force	 to	 boost	 its	 own	 sovereign	 structures	 and	 demobilise	 the	government	rather	than	defeat	it	directly.			Its	use	of	 violence	was	always	designed	 for	political	 or	 economic	effect.	As	 an	insurgent	 force	 it	 attacked	 the	most	 unpopular	 government	 outposts	 to	 build	support	amongst	the	populations	most	affected	by	government	efforts	to	collect	rice	(Kiernan,	2004).	Strategically,	it	tried	to	foment	instability	to	induce	a	coup	in	Phnom	Penh.	When	it	transitioned	to	a	conventional	force,	it	attacked	supply	routes	 and	 critical	 infrastructure,	 precisely	 because	 it	 diminished	 the	government’s	ability	to	provide	selective	economic	incentives	to	the	population.	Historical	 accounts	 of	 the	 conflict	 even	 show	 Pol	 Pot	 recognising	 in	 the	 early	1970s	that	the	government	would	inevitably	collapse	if	the	Khmer	Rouge	could	sustain	the	military	stalemate	(Kiernan,	2004).			
Shaping	strategy	
	






faced	by	many	rebel	groups,	securing	territory	to	build	sovereign	structures.	Most	rebels	have	to	rely	on	pre-existing	social	networks	to	build	support,	which	creates	competing	 loyalties	 for	 many	 in	 the	 population.	 North	 Vietnam	 allowed	 the	Khmer	 Rouge	 to	 break	 down	 these	 pre-existing	 social	 networks	 and	 redesign	society	to	serve	its	military	needs.	Without	these	sovereign	structures	the	rebels	would	have	found	it	much	more	difficult	to	capture	power	in	1975.			For	 the	 government,	 US	 support	may	well	 have	 facilitated	 its	 ultimate	 defeat.	Aside	 from	 the	 effect	 its	 bombing	 had	 on	 the	 rural	 population,	 US	 military	intervention	 created	 a	 classic	 aid	 trap.	 Lon	 Nol	 believed	 US	 military	 support	would	be	sufficient	to	defeat	the	Khmer	Rouge.	As	a	result,	he	lacked	the	incentive	to	develop	effective	institutions	to	mobilise	support	from	the	population	(Deac	and	 Summers	 Jr,	 2000).	 This	 represents	 an	 important	 lesson	 for	 external	governments	 seeking	 to	 support	 allied	 nations;	 support	 has	 to	 be	 credibly	contingent	on	 the	development	of	 indigenous	sovereign	structures	 for	shaping	population	 behaviour.	 If	 an	 external	 actor	 provides	 the	military	 force	 or	 pays	recruits	directly,	this	will	lessen	the	short-term	need	for	indigenous	governments	to	 develop	 mobilisation	 structures	 of	 their	 own,	 forcing	 external	 backers	 to	continue	providing	support	or	see	their	allies	defeated.			
Personalities	and	ideology	















































support	to	the	main	model	of	conflict	proposed	in	this	thesis;	the	rebels	achieved	their	 aims	 by	 undermining	 government	 sovereign	 power	 in	 the	 enclave	 and	creating	 resilient	 mobilisation	 structures	 that	 enabled	 them	 to	 capture	 and	control	the	region.				The	polity	score	in	Azerbaijan	decreased	between	1992	and	1993	from	plus	one	to	 minus-three	 and	 the	 government	 had	 external	 support.	 This	 explains	 the	model’s	prediction	that	there	was	a	moderate	chance	of	a	government	victory	in	1994.	Examining	the	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	offers	the	chance,	therefore,	to	explore	the	utility	of	these	variables	for	predicting	conflict	outcomes	when	we	know	they	did	not	allow	the	government	to	generate	population	support	in	the	manner	expected.			The	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	has	a	number	of	other	dynamics	that	makes	it	an	 interesting	 case	 study.	 Firstly,	 it	 reinforces	 the	 crucial	 role	 external	interventions	play	in	creating	opportunities	and	disincentives	for	belligerents	to	build	resilient	mobilisation	structures.	Both	sides	had	external	support,	but	the	rebels	 exploited	 support	 from	 the	 Republic	 of	 Armenia55	 to	 build	 sovereign	structures,	 while	 the	 government’s	 support	 simply	 reflected	 its	 inability	 to	mobilise	its	own	army.			Nagorno-Karabakh’s	 war	 also	 highlights	 the	 role	 ethnic	 identity	 can	 play	 in	determining	 the	 strength	 and	 weakness	 of	 military	 actors.	 Books	 such	 as	






































considered	accepting	autonomy	in	Azerbaijan	as	part	of	a	political	settlement	to	end	the	violence	(2001).			Ultimately,	 the	 Soviets	 called	 off	 the	 operation.	 The	 army	 was	 sent	 back	 to	Moscow	 in	 response	 to	 the	 coup	 to	 remove	 President	 Gorbachev,	 which	 also	signalled	the	final	days	of	the	Soviet	Union.	Shortly	afterwards	both	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	declared	 independence,	 as	did	Nagorno-Karabakh.	The	break-up	of	the	Soviet	military	also	meant	the	two	belligerents	suddenly	had	access	to	more	weaponry,	both	 in	 terms	of	quantity	of	arms	and	 its	 lethality	 (de	Waal,	2013).	Increased	weaponry	and	the	development	of	independent	sovereign	structures	meant	violence	escalated	and	took	an	increasingly	organised	form,	transitioning	the	enclave	to	a	state	of	war.	Violence,	however,	was	still	mainly	communal	 in	nature,	with	 local	militias	making	up	the	majority	of	armed	personnel	on	both	sides.	The	 rebels	had	a	burgeoning	political	 structure,	while	 the	authorities	 in	Baku	now	had	control	over	 the	counterinsurgent	response.	Nagorno-Karabakh	found	 itself	 in	a	straightforward	state-building	competition.	The	war	would	be	won	by	the	nascent	political	structure	able	to	build	effective	sovereign	structures	across	the	territory	and	organise	their	militias	and	communities	into	a	cohesive	military	force.			






rebels	 delivered	 a	 range	 of	 incentives	 and	 converted	 the	 clear	 sentimental	support	 they	enjoyed	 into	active	behavioural	 support,	 allowing	 them	to	create	effective	political	and	military	institutions.			
	
A	de	facto	government		The	rebels	created	local	governance	structures	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	when	the	pre-existing	 ones	 were	 dissolved	 by	 the	 Soviets	 in	 1989.	 One	 of	 the	 main	challenges	 faced	 by	 rebel	 groups	 is	 building	 sovereign	 structures	 that	 can	compete	with	pre-existing	government	institutions.	The	Azerbaijani	government	was	inadvertently	demobilised	by	the	Soviets,	creating	a	significant	opportunity	for	the	rebels	to	develop	mobilisation	structures	of	their	own.			It	formed	local	councils	that	then	elected	a	national	council,	which	became	the	de	
facto	 government	 of	 Armenian-controlled	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 (Zurcher,	 2007).	According	 to	 Levon	 Abrahamian	 this	 was	 particularly	 effective	 as	 Karabakh	society	 remained	 feudally	 structured,	 which	 the	 councils	 could	 be	 organised	around.	It	was,	therefore,	possible	for	rebel	authorities	to	communicate	with	the	population	 through	 societal	 structures	 that	 were	 understood	 and	 respected	(2001).				While	the	economic	blockade	created	hardship	in	rebel-held	regions,	the	rebels	alleviated	this	suffering	through	the	course	of	the	conflict.	Suzanne	Goldenberg	states	that	by	the	end	of	1993,	life	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	had	returned	to	a	degree	of	normality	(1994).	The	rebels	achieved	this	through	five	main	efforts.		






population.	Human	Rights	Watch	reports	show	that	they	ran	a	“highly	centralised	state”	 (1994;	 p27).	 They	 controlled	 the	 gas	 market,	 ensuring	 it	 was	 evenly	distributed	and	affordable	 for	 the	population.	This	was	 in	contrast	 to	even	the	Republic	of	Armenia,	where	the	high	price	of	gas,	due	to	a	rapacious	black	market,	caused	significant	socioeconomic	problems	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	They	also	managed	to	keep	basic	services	running,	such	as	hospitals,	and	ensured	most	children	could	attend	school	(Cox	and	Eibner,	1993).		
External	support	
	There	is	little	doubt	that	external	support	for	the	rebels	was	a	key	factor.	Support	from	Armenia-proper	allowed	the	rebels	to	shape	population	behaviour	in	two	main	ways.	Firstly,	it	gave	them	a	military	force	capable	of	capturing	territory	in	the	 first	 place.	 By	 1994,	 there	 were	 10,000	 people	 in	 the	 Nagorno-Karabakh	Army,	but	20,000	Republic	of	Armenia	troops	fighting	on	the	rebel	side	(Zurcher,	2007;	p175).	Nagorno-Karabakh	is	highly	mountainous	and	access	in	and	out	of	the	region	is	extremely	difficult.	Militarily	this	gives	the	defenders	a	significant	advantage.		Chorbajian,	et	al.	claim	attackers	would	need	a	ten-to-one	numerical	advantage	 in	 order	 to	 conquer	 the	 region	 (1994;	 p41).	 The	 military	 support	provided	 by	 the	 Republic	 of	 Armenia	 helped	 the	 rebels	 capture	 this	 territory,	creating	a	security	blanket,	which	allowed	the	rebels	to	build	effective	sovereign	structures.			The	Republic	of	Armenia	also	provided	significant	economic	aid,	which	the	rebels	distributed	 between	 military	 spending	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 supplies	 to	 the	population	(Lynch,	2002).			
Military	activity	






to	Armenia	and	partially	alleviating	the	blockade	on	the	region	(Croissant,	1998).	That	 same	month,	 the	 rebels	 captured	 the	 Lachin	 corridor,	 an	 area	 outside	 of	Nagorno-Karabakh,	which	gave	them	a	land	connection	with	Armenia,	essentially	breaking	 the	blockade	 (Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	They	continued	 to	widen	this	corridor	throughout	the	conflict,	enabling	them	to	fully	exploit	their	external	support.			The	 rebels	also	 focused	resources	on	capturing	 towns	 that	had	socioeconomic	value.	For	example,	the	capture	of	Mardakert	in	1993	secured	access	to	the	main	reservoir	and	hydroelectric	power	station	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	Human	Rights	Watch	claims	this	gave	the	rebels	the	capacity	to	provide	basic	services	to	rebel-held	areas	(1994).	According	to	International	Crisis	Group	reports,	they	chose	to	create	settlements	in	places	such	as	the	Lachin	corridor,	which	is	key	to	supplying	the	enclave.	In	contrast,	they	left	areas	without	political	or	economic	value	empty	after	ejecting	the	Azerbaijani	population	(2005).		In	the	summer	of	1993,	Armenian	forces	captured	significant	amounts	of	territory	outside	of	Nagorno-Karabakh	claiming	it	made	them	better	able	to	defend	their	constituent	population.	These	offensives	included	expanding	the	territory	around	the	Lachin	corridor,	most	notably	the	town	of	Kelbajar,	which	further	facilitated	economic	and	military	support	from	Armenia	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	This	demonstrates	how	military	activity	is	a	crucial	element	of	civil	war.	However,	it	needs	to	be	examined	to	see	what	effect	it	has	on	a	belligerent’s	capacity	to	shape	population	behaviour.	In	Nagorno-Karabakh,	capturing	specific	territory	was	key	to	 enabling	 the	 rebels	 to	 generate	 support	 by	 facilitating	 political	 and	socioeconomic	activity	and	stabilising	life	inside	rebel-controlled	areas.				






rebels	 clearly	 saw	 this	 as	 a	 genuine	 strategic	 threat.	 For	 one,	 they	 ensured	Armenian	 populations	 did	 not	 flee	 despite	 pressure	 from	 Azerbaijani	 forces.	Rebel	political	authorities	forbade	civilians	from	fleeing	conflict	areas.	According	to	 Vicken	 Cheterian	 this	 was	 because	 they	 recognised	 that	 once	 an	 area	 was	depopulated	 it	 would	 be	 much	 more	 difficult	 to	 motivate	 forces	 to	 defend	 it	(2009;	 p131).	 Rebels	 also	 focused	military	 activity	 on	 Azerbaijani	 towns	 that	were	being	used	to	launch	attacks	against	Armenian	communities.	They	would	then	depopulate	these	areas,	ensuring	the	attacks	ceased.			
Expelling	opposition	






civilians	because	 (we)	did	not	have	enough	 forces	 to	occupy	 land	and	pacify	a	hostile	 civilian	 population.”	 (Human	 Rights	Watch,	 1994;	 p60).	 By	 the	 end	 of	1992,	rebel	forces	had	expelled	nearly	the	entire	Azerbaijani	population	(Helsinki	Watch,	1993).	
	
Political	power	creates	military	power	

















force	solely	to	demoralise	Armenian	civilians,	targeting	towns	and	villages	that	had	no	military	value	(1994).	In	the	early	stages	of	the	conflict,	when	Azerbaijani	militias	 still	 controlled	 large	 numbers	 of	 towns	 and	 villages	 they	 would	indiscriminately	launch	artillery	barrages	against	Armenian	population	centres,	including	Stepanakert	(Maresca,	1996).			As	 well	 as	 using	 violence	 to	 affect	 population	 behaviour,	 Azerbaijani	 forces	blockaded	 the	 region	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 undermine	 rebel	 capacity	 to	 generate	support.	In	the	early	years	of	the	conflict	this	blockade	did	have	an	effect.	Human	Rights	Watch	reported	in	1992	that	Stepanakert	was	effectively	at	a	standstill.			
Emptying	Nagorno-Karabakh	
	Vicken	Cheterian	argues	the	government	learnt	from	Sumgait	and	tried	to	use	this	strategy	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 to	 create	 larger	 swathes	 of	 territory	 it	 could	control	 (2009;	 p151).	 In	 Sumgait,	 Azerbaijani	 pressure	 incited	 hundreds	 of	thousands	of	Armenians	to	leave	other	parts	of	Azerbaijan	after	the	troubles	had	begun	 in	 1988.	 In	 1990,	 as	 the	 conflict	 began	 to	 grow,	 it	 emptied	 numerous	villages	in	northern	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	during	Operation	Ring	10,000	people	were	deported	(Cheterian,	2009).	This	was	the	centrepiece	of	the	government’s	strategy	 to	 defeat	 rebel	 forces.	 It	 tried	 to	 eliminate	 rebel	 capacity	 to	 generate	support	 and	 regenerate	 military	 losses	 by	 removing	 the	 population	 from	rebellious	areas.		Ultimately,	 however,	 the	 strategy	was	 doomed	 to	 fail.	 The	 pre-existing	 ethnic	balance	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	the	ability	of	the	population	in	the	region	to	organise	themselves	into	defensive	militias	made	it	impossible	for	the	Azerbaijani	authorities	to	completely	purge	the	region	(Cheterian,	2009).		






effective	force	in	Nagorno-Karabakh.	Despite	sharing	the	government’s	desire	to	retain	control	over	the	region,	Azerbaijani	communities	across	the	whole	country	did	not	provide	the	government	behavioural	support.			Many	 authors	 document	 how	 each	 Azerbaijani	 village	 had	 its	 own	 militia	commanded	by	a	local	strong	man	with	no	central	authority	coordinating	activity	(Aldstadt,	 1997;	 de	Waal,	 2013;	 Human	 Rights	Watch,	 1992	 and	 1994).	 	 The	problem	 this	 created	 for	 Azerbaijan	 was	 that	 foot	 soldiers’	 loyalty	 was	 then	directed	towards	the	strong	man,	and	his	personal	goals,	rather	than	the	broader	war	effort.	 For	 example,	Colonel	 Suret	Husseinov,	 grew	 in	power	 through	 “his	ability	 to	 keep	 his	men	well-fed	 and	 shod”	 (Goldenberg,	 1994;	 p124).	He	 also	secured	 acclaim	 from	 the	 Azerbaijani	 population	 after	 some	 early	 military	victories.	Consequently,	despite	failing	to	score	any	further	military	success	and	with	no	officially	appointed	position,	in	1993,	he	was	effectively	commanding	the	northern	front	of	Azerbaijani	forces	(Aldstadt,	1997).			The	first	president	of	Azerbaijan,	Ayaz	Mutalibov,	rather	than	organising	these	militias	into	one	fighting	force,	attempted	to	disband	them.	He	feared	they	were	more	likely	to	be	used	against	him	than	against	Armenian	rebels	(Kaldor,	2007).	This	weakened	the	Azerbaijani	government’s	fighting	capacity	in	the	early	period	of	the	conflict	as	Azerbaijan	lacked	a	functioning	military	(ibid.).	NGO	reports	at	the	 time	 show	 that	 there	 was	 a	 limited	 command	 and	 control	 relationship	between	the	Azerbaijan	central	command	and	the	militias	fighting	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	 (Human	 Rights	Watch,	 1992).	 In	 June	 1992,	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 APF,	Albufaz	Elchibey,	succeeded	Mutalibov	as	president.	Elchibey	also	failed	to	unite	the	 various	 fighting	 forces	 operating	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 (Aldstadt,	 1997;	p136).		






of	 Conflict	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 (1994),	 shows	 this	was	 standard	 practice	 for	Azerbaijani	 forces	 throughout	 the	 conflict	 and	 the	 militias	 rarely	 stood	 and	fought;	 surrendering	 Azerbaijani	 civilians	 to	 face	 the	 full	 force	 of	 Armenian	advances.		








	Despite	the	dysfunction	in	the	capital,	at	the	start	of	the	conflict	there	remained	an	Azerbaijani	population	inside	Nagorno-Karabakh	that	the	government	could	have	 used	 to	 build	 support.	 Azerbaijanis	 still	 accounted	 for	 25	 percent	 of	 the	region’s	 population.	 However,	 government	 signals	 through	 the	 course	 of	 the	conflict	were	that	they	were	not	interested	in	supporting	their	needs.	For	starters,	the	Azerbaijani	government’s	lack	of	control	forced	the	Azerbaijani	population	to	seek	protection	from	militias	(Geukjian,	2012).	Once	the	tide	of	the	conflict	turned	against	 the	 Azerbaijanis,	 the	 only	 signal	 the	 population	 received	was	 that	 the	government	would	not	protect	 it	 from	rebel	 forces.	When	 the	government	did	offer	 to	evacuate	civilians,	soldiers	 forced	themselves	onto	helicopters	and	 left	civilians	behind	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	Thomas	de	Waal	documents	two	visible	 impacts	 this	 perception	 had	 on	 the	 Azerbaijani	 population	 behaviour;	civilians	 would	 flee	 cities	 being	 attacked	 (2013;	 loc3521)	 and	 then	 refuse	 to	return	 to	 areas	 that	 government	 forces	 liberated	 (loc4377).	 This	 is	 in	 stark	contrast	to	rebel	ability	to	protect	its	constituent	population	and	motivate	it	to	stay	in	the	region.	The	government	could	no	longer	generate	manpower,	supplies	and	finances,	while	the	rebels	had	steady	access	to	all	different	types	of	support.			
How	to	lose	a	civil	war	












Horadiz	 and	 elsewhere	 abandoned	 the	 civilians	 and	 fled	 the	 battle	zones	without	putting	up	any	 fight....It	would	have	been	possible	 to	create	an	army	over	two	or	three	years	and	defend	Azerbaijan.	But	this	opportunity	 was	 lost,	 and	 Azerbaijan's	 defense	 (sic)	 has	 suffered	rather	 than	 improved.	 Various	 groups	 and	 battalions	 fought	independently	of	each	other.	They	served	various	forces	and	goals	and	lacked	 an	 overall	 military	 strategy.”	 (Human	 Rights	 Watch,	 1994;	pp82–83).			
The	ceasefire	







The	rebels	made	these	gains	as	they	mobilised	their	own	constituent	population	and	demobilised	that	of	 the	government.	They	created	political	structures	 that	converted	 popular	 sentiment	 into	 behavioural	 support.	 They	 expelled	 the	Azerbaijani	 population,	 removing	 the	 government’s	 capacity	 to	 generate	resistance	inside	Nagorno-Karabakh.	At	the	same	time,	the	government	failed	to	cohere	 local	 support	 into	 organised	military	 activity,	with	 local	 powerbrokers	instead	using	their	influence	on	the	ground	to	boost	their	own	political	power.			However,	the	rebels	failed	to	force	the	government	to	formally	recognise	these	gains	and,	at	the	time	of	writing,	Azerbaijan	still	refuses	to	recognise	Nagorno-Karabakh.	Given	their	relative	strength,	why	did	the	rebels	agree	to	a	ceasefire	without	having	achieved	this	recognition?			The	ending	of	the	conflict	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	has	been	held	up	as	an	example	of	a	mutually	hurting	military	stalemate	inducing	the	parties	to	sign	a	ceasefire	(Halbach,	2013;	Mooradian	and	Druckman,	1999).	Indeed,	the	dataset	used	in	the	statistical	 model	 shows	 a	 significant	 rise	 in	 battlefield	 deaths	 in	 the	 year	preceding	the	ceasefire.	This	does	not	capture	the	months	before	the	ceasefire	in	1994,	which	according	to	reports	also	saw	significant	war	deaths	(Human	Rights	Watch,	1994).	However,	the	model	showed	no	correlation	between	an	increase	in	battlefield	 deaths	 and	 the	 end	 of	 civil	 wars.	 The	 idea	 of	 a	 military	 hurting	stalemate	inducing	a	ceasefire	either	makes	Nagorno-Karabakh	an	anomaly	or	it	is	not	a	complete	explanation.						






clearly	‘hurting’	and	had	realised	the	war	could	not	be	won	militarily	now	that	the	rebels	held	 the	 territorial	 advantage.	However,	Mooradian	and	Druckman	also	argue	that	previous	mediations	had	been	doomed	to	fail	because	both	actors	had	divided	militaries	 and	weak	 political	 leaders	 (p726).	 Before	 the	 ceasefire	was	signed	in	1994	this	also	changed	in	Azerbaijan.	Losses	in	the	conflict	had	already	led	 to	 the	 fall	 of	 two	 Azerbaijani	 presidents	 in	 1992	 and	 1993.	 The	 ascent	 of	Heydar	 Aliyev	 brought	 a	 stronger	 leader	 to	 power.	 According	 to	 Carol	Migdalovitz,	 Aliyev	 recognised	 that	 further	 losses	would	 threaten	 his	 political	power.	However,	in	the	early	months	of	his	reign	he	had	the	capacity	to	disband	the	militias	that	could	threaten	him	(2001).	In	other	words,	Aliyev	was	able	to	impose	an	unpopular	settlement	on	his	constituents	when	it	became	clear	the	war	could	not	be	won.	The	previous	two	presidents	faced	similar	costs	for	continuing	the	conflict,	but	any	signs	of	weakness	would	have	certainly	led	to	their	demise.	Aliyev’s	ability	to	prevent	opposition	to	a	settlement,	in	other	words	to	control	the	behaviour	of	his	constituent	population,	was	as	key	to	his	ability	to	sign	the	ceasefire	as	the	heavily	unfavourable	military	situation.		
	
The	rebels	














































outside	support	(2007).	It	was	very	easy	for	Azerbaijan	to	impose	the	economic	blockade	 on	 the	 region,	 undermining	 the	 rebels’	 access	 to	 both	 economic	 and	military	 support	 from	 the	 Republic	 of	 Armenia.	 As	 such,	 while	 the	 territorial	situation	hugely	favoured	the	rebels	in	1994,	in	1992	it	made	it	much	easier	for	the	government	to	isolate	the	rebels.	Territory,	therefore,	played	a	key	role	in	the	conflict,	but	only	when	one	 looks	at	how	it	affected	 the	ability	 to	 the	rebels	 to	generate	support	from	the	population	at	various	points	in	the	conflict.			











	External	support	played	an	important	role	as	in	most	wars,	however,	it	was	not	the	quantity,	but	the	quality	of	support	that	made	the	difference.	The	Republic	of	Armenia’s	support	gave	the	rebels	in	Nagorno-Karabakh	the	ability	to	generate	internal	 support	 in	 a	 way	 they	 could	 have	 never	 achieved	 by	 themselves.	 In	contrast,	the	majority	of	the	meaningful	support	the	government	received	from	Turkey,	Russia	and	mercenaries	from	Afghanistan	and	the	former	Soviet	Union,	was	military	 in	nature	(de	Waal,	2013).	There	 is	no	evidence	that	 this	support	caused	the	government	to	become	complacent	about	its	ability	to	win	the	conflict,	as	the	Cambodian	government	had	done.	That	they	needed	these	forces,	however,	demonstrates	Baku’s	inability	to	build	its	own	force	in	the	region.	Before	1992,	Azerbaijan	 relied	 on	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 to	 control	 the	 population	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh.	Once	 the	Soviet	Union	 fell,	Azerbaijan	could	no	 longer	maintain	 the	same	threat	of	violence	 to	control	 the	Armenian	population	(Cheterian,	2009).	Essentially,	the	Republic	of	Armenia	replaced	the	Soviet	Union	as	the	guarantors	of	security	 in	Nagorno-Karabakh,	allowing	rebels	 to	build	sovereign	structures	and	demobilise	the	government	in	the	region.		
History	






communities	perceived	events	as	they	were	unfolding.62	Armenian	communities	believed	 the	 costs	 of	 not	 supporting	 the	 rebel	 authorities	 would	 be	 their	expulsion	from	the	region	(Cheterian,	2009).	This	made	it	easier	for	the	rebels	to	generate	support	 from	the	population.	Moreover,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	government	had	 always	 succeeded	 in	 suppressing	 dissent	 in	 the	 region	 by	 punishing	Armenians	 violently	 and	 removing	 rebellious	 populations	 meant	 this	 was	 its	default	strategy.	However,	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union	removed	the	extra	military	muscle	 the	 Azerbaijani	 authorities	 could	 rely	 on	 to	 execute	 this	 strategy	 and	allowed	 the	Republic	 of	Armenia	 to	 support	 its	 ethnic	brethren.	The	 legacy	of	history	 and	 ethnic	 identity,	 therefore,	 cannot	 be	 discounted	 in	 shaping	 the	strategy	belligerents	use	to	influence	population	behaviour.		
	







strategy	 that	 the	 government	has	 continued	 to	 employ	 since	1994	 (Laitin	 and	Suny,	 1999).	 No	 previous	 leader	 could	 have	 achieved	 this	 without	 losing	 his	position.	 Political	 dynamics	 not	 explicitly	 linked	 to	 the	 conflict	 in	 a	 state,	therefore,	also	clearly	play	a	role	in	the	strategies	conflict	actors	can	employ.		
Conclusion	
	



















Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	Number	of	obs				 826	Wald	chi2(45)	 -	Prob	>	chi2	 -	Table	22:	Model	ten	-	Full	model	with	‘frozen	conflicts’	removed.	
	
Support	for	hypotheses			Despite	 being	 a	 deviant	 case,	 the	 conflict	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 offers	 strong	support	for	the	theories	developed	in	this	thesis.	Nagorno-Karabakh	reinforces	the	 finding	 from	 Cambodia	 that	 popular	 support	 is	 only	 important	when	 it	 is	








































civil	war	is	rebel	ability	to	demobilise	the	government.	On	this	basis,	we	reasoned	that	a	drop	in	GDP	should	indicate	a	government	struggling	to	generate	support	from	its	constituent	population,	making	a	rebel	victory	more	likely.	The	statistical	model	suggested	this	was	true,	but	the	substantive	effect	was	small.	In	contrast,	the	wars	Burundi	and	Cambodia	showed	the	general	economy	was	a	key	factor	in	determining	the	course	of	these	wars.	As	all	other	variables	are	contraindicated,	Zimbabwe,	 therefore,	 offers	 the	 opportunity	 to	 examine	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	discrepancy.			The	conflict	in	Zimbabwe	is	also	instructive	as	it	allows	us	to	examine	how	rebels	can	 win	 when	 facing	 a	 technically	 superior	 military	 force.	 While	 being	outnumbered,	 both	 the	 Cambodian	 and	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 rebels	 faced	dysfunctional	 government	 forces.	 The	 Rhodesian	 government’s	counterinsurgency	tactics,	in	contrast,	have	been	lauded	over	(J.R.T.	Wood,	1997).	Yet	the	government	was	defeated	and	the	rebels	grew	in	strength	throughout	the	war.	Zimbabwe,	therefore,	serves	as	a	reminder	that	success	on	the	battlefield	is	not	determined	by	who	wins	in	the	conventional	military	sense.			
















Then,	in	1972,	a	group	of	ZANU	insurgents	attacked	the	Altena	farm,	marking	the	start	of	the	next	stage	of	the	conflict.	Violence	increased	significantly	as	compared	to	1965-1968.	However,	government	 forces	still	held	the	upper	hand	and	kept	insurgent	 activity	 to	 a	 minimum,	 preventing	 it	 from	 growing	 beyond	 a	 few	hundred	guerrillas.	At	the	end	of	1974,	South	Africa	launched	its	policy	of	Détente	to	 improve	 relations	with	 its	 southern	 African	 neighbours.	 Part	 of	 this	 policy	involved	putting	pressure	on	Ian	Smith,	the	prime	minister	of	Rhodesia,	to	agree	to	a	ceasefire,	 free	 insurgent	 leaders	 from	prison	and	seek	a	political	 solution.	Smith	 reluctantly	 agreed,	 believing	 that	 the	 insurgents	 were	 close	 to	 defeat	(Matthews,	1990).			Despite	a	drop	in	military	activity,	there	was	no	real	prospect	of	a	political	deal	being	reached	and	violence	began	to	pick	up	again	in	1976.	By	December	1979,	the	government	had	declared	martial	law	across	90	percent	of	the	country.	The	government	entered	negotiations	with	the	rebel	leaders;	Robert	Mugabe	of	ZANU	and	Joseph	Nkomo	of	ZAPU.	At	Lancaster	House,	it	agreed	to	a	ceasefire,	elections	in	February	1980,	a	limit	to	the	power	of	white	politicians	to	veto	legislation	and	an	end	to	white	control	over	the	security	forces.	In	return,	the	nationalists	agreed	to	 delay	 land	 reform	 and	 guarantee	 some	 civil	 service	 pensions	 and	 property	rights.	 The	 amount	 of	 political	 change	 the	 deal	 represented	means	 the	war	 is	classified	as	a	rebel	victory,	a	victory	that	took	15	years	of	war.	The	remainder	of	the	 chapter	 will	 analyse	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 belligerents	 to	 shape	 population	behaviour	and	how	it	changed	through	these	various	phases	of	the	conflict.			
Background	and	causes	














Mugabe	himself	stated	insurgent	strategy	at	this	point	was	still	to	force	Britain	to	intervene,	rather	than	try	to	bring	the	government	down	directly	(1983).			After	Britain	failed	to	intervene	when	the	Rhodesian	Front	declared	UDI.	Many	nationalists	were	now	convinced	that	an	armed	struggle	was	the	only	means	to	effect	political	change	(Mugabe,	1983).	Small	insurgent	units	began	to	infiltrate	into	 Zimbabwe	 (de	 Boer,	 2011).	 Even	 though	 they	 were	 easily	 detected	 and	destroyed	by	government	 forces,	a	state	of	 ‘dual	sovereignty’	emerged	and	the	war	began.		











The	insurgency	failed	to	build	relations	with	the	population	and	found	it	difficult	to	recruit	fighters.	The	promise	of	addressing	African	grievances	was	a	collective	post-war	incentive,	which	meant	it	was	unlikely	to	generate	the	level	of	popular	participation	 rebels	 needed	 to	 challenge	 the	 government,	 especially	 when	 set	against	the	risk	of	punishment	for	supporting	the	insurgency.	During	this	period	rebel	numbers	did	not	grow	significantly.	By	1968,	168	insurgents	had	been	killed	for	the	loss	of	only	twelve	members	of	government	security	forces	and	the	rebels	had	failed	to	establish	a	permanent	presence	inside	Zimbabwe	(de	Boer,	2011;	p36).			
A	switch	in	strategy	
	Between	1968	and	1972	the	 insurgency	engaged	 in	almost	no	military	activity	(Cilliers,	1986).	Instead,	insurgents	spent	time	developing	networks	of	support	that	created	reciprocal	relations	with	the	population	(Kirk,	1975;	Moorcroft	and	McLaughlin,	2008).			






conflict	(Martin	and	Johnson,	1981;	p79).	Martin	and	Johnson	estimate	that	at	the	end	of	the	conflict	there	were	50,000	mujibas	working	for	the	insurgency	(ibid.),	demonstrating	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 rebel’s	 support	 networks	 throughout	 rural	Zimbabwe.		While	never	really	penetrating	urban	areas,	insurgents	obtained	support	from	the	cities	 by	 developing	 ties	 with	 businessmen.	 Bus	 companies	 would	 smuggle	recruits	out	of	urban	areas	to	training	camps	in	bordering	countries.	Missionaries	and	 storekeepers	 provided	 food,	 clothing	 and	 medicine	 (Caute,	 1983).	Unemployed	people	were	paid	to	 inform	on	government	activities	(Martin	and	Johnson,	1981)	and	females	supported	ZANU	by	working	as	nurses	and	teachers	in	camps	in	Mozambique	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).			These	support	networks	demonstrate	how	the	rebels	structured	their	solutions	to	the	collective	mobilisation	problem.	Unlike	the	Khmer	Rouge,	who	broke	down	society	and	rebuilt	it	from	the	bottom	up,	the	Zimbabwean	insurgents	generally	worked	 with	 pre-existing	 social	 structures.	 Only	 where	 current	 societal	structures	did	not	meet	their	needs,	did	they	create	new	sections	within	society	to	 meet	 a	 specific	 purpose;	 the	 creation	 of	 mujibas	 being	 the	 most	 obvious	example.			
Public	outreach	






had	lost	most	of	their	influence	over	local	populations	as	they	had	become	closely	associated	with	the	regime.	Those	tribal	chiefs	that	had	resisted	the	government	were	 given	 positions	 at	 the	 head	 of	 committees,	 restoring	 their	 power	 and	ensuring	their	support	(Ranger,	1985).	These	influential	individuals	would	then	convince	 the	 wider	 population	 to	 participate	 in	 insurgent	 committees	 and	organise	political	meetings,	or	pungwes,	which	gave	the	insurgents	a	platform	to	appeal	for	support.			The	insurgent	tactic	of	engaging	with	local	figures,	providing	them	with	political	and	social	power,	contributed	greatly	to	rebel	strength,	allowing	the	insurgency	to	mobilise	support	through	local	social	networks.			
Political	meetings	
	Once	 they	 established	 access	 to	 a	 community,	 the	 insurgents	 attempted	 to	politicise	 the	population	 so	 it	 saw	more	benefit	 to	providing	 support.	Political	meetings,	or	pungwes,	were	often	the	first	exposure	the	population	had	with	the	insurgency.	Upon	entering	an	area	the	rebels	would	call	a	meeting	for	the	whole	community,	attendance	at	which	was	compulsory	(Lan,	1985).	Meetings	would	then	 be	 held	 almost	 every	 night	 by	 a	 political	 commissar	 (Moorcroft	 and	McLaughlin,	 2008).	 The	 meetings	 addressed	 local	 grievances	 such	 as	 land	allocation,	 education,	 poverty,	 unemployment	 or	 repressive	 government	behaviour	 (Chung	 and	 Kaarsholm,	 2006).	 This	 was	 another	 advantage	 of	engaging	 local	notables	 first,	 in	 that	 the	 rebels	 could	 identify	 these	grievances	before	their	first	direct	meeting	with	the	population.	The	population,	therefore,	understood	 the	 political	 incentives	 the	 rebels	 were	 promising	 as	 tangible	socioeconomic	benefits	rather	than	vague	political	constructs.			
Exploiting	social	dynamics	






immediate	social	and	political	power	they	felt	supporting	rebels	would	give	them,	rather	than	a	desire	to	see	the	government	defeated	(1991;	p8).			She	lists	a	number	of	social	cleavages	that	the	insurgency	exploited.	She	claims	that	many	poor	Africans	saw	association	with	the	insurgency	not	only	as	financial	opportunity,	 but	 also	 an	 chance	 to	 improve	 their	 personal	 standing	 (p187).	People	 also	 used	 the	 insurgency	 to	 settle	 socio-political	 scores.	Weaker	 tribes	would	support	the	rebels,	knowing	they	could	exploit	the	power	that	controlling	village	committees	would	give	them	over	stronger	tribes,	 in	terms	of	accessing	land	 and	 resources	 (p199).	 Communities	 would	 invite	 insurgents	 into	 their	villages	to	rid	them	of	unpopular	headmen,	regardless	of	whether	they	had	a	real	connection	to	the	government	(p199).	Young	people	saw	the	insurgency	as	a	way	to	increase	their	influence	within	traditional	family	and	tribal	structures.	Young	people	were	subordinated	to	elders	in	African	society	and	their	role	as	the	eyes	and	 ears	 of	 insurgency	 in	 local	 villages	 gave	 them	 power	 to	 challenge	 this	traditional	authority	(p150).			As	predicted,	the	rebels	used	social	cleavages	not	just	at	the	national	level	but	also	at	the	local	level	to	incentivise	segments	of	the	population	to	provide	support.			
Coercion	








	The	insurgency	never	held	absolute	authority	over	territory	during	the	conflict	and	never,	therefore,	created	state-like	sovereign	structures.	The	rebels	did	not,	for	example,	provide	rudimentary	healthcare	or	education	for	the	population	in	the	manner	of	the	Khmer	Rouge	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).	The	only	place	they	provided	services	to	the	population	was	in	refugee	camps,	mainly	in	Zambia	and	Mozambique.	These	camps	were	normally	near	military	bases	and	were	run	by	the	insurgents.	Many	people	chose	to	travel	to	these	refugee	camps	to	avoid	government	 repression	 but	 also	 as	 it	 presented	 an	 opportunity	 to	 get	 an	education	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006).	The	insurgency	then	used	these	refugee	camps	as	a	source	of	recruits	and	more	general	support.			I	will	not	attempt	to	assess	which	of	these	various	strands	of	rebel	activity	was	most	 important.	 Scholars	 have	 argued	 this	 for	 over	 thirty	 years.	 Most	 of	 this	disagreement	can	probably	be	put	down	to	the	different	locations	in	which	they	conducted	 their	 primary	 research,	 with	 each	 community	 almost	 certainly	experiencing	 the	war	differently.	Commentators	appear	 to	unanimously	agree,	however,	that	active	support	was	provided	to	the	insurgency	inside	Zimbabwe.	In	reality,	 the	 rural	 population	 almost	 certainly	 responded	 to	 a	 combination	 of	education,	coercion,	social	advancement	opportunities	and	influence	from	local	leaders.				
Undermining	governance	






centre	for	the	insurgency	in	the	early	years	of	the	conflict,	as	it	had	been	neglected	for	years	and	had	a	very	limited	regime	presence	(1986).			The	rebels	also	targeted	African	civilians	associated	with	the	regime.	Before	the	conflict,	 the	government	appointed	 loyal	 chiefs	 to	govern	African	areas.	Chiefs	were	a	key	source	of	intelligence	for	the	government	during	the	late	sixties.	To	counter	this	threat,	the	insurgency	threatened	chiefs	unless	they	broke	relations	with	the	government,	killing	many	that	refused	to	comply.	The	result	was	that	African	civilians	refused	to	work	in	local	government	councils,	which	then	ceased	to	function	in	many	areas	(Kriger,	1991).			The	 rebels	 considered	 teachers	 as	 collaborators	 (Kriger,	 1991)	 and	 tried	 to	prevent	African	labourers	working	on	white	farms	(Mtisi	et	al.,	2009).	Quite	apart	from	the	obvious	effects	this	had	on	the	white	economy,	it	also	removed	economic	relations	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 African	 population;	 reducing	 the	former’s	ability	to	either	financially	sanction	or	reward	the	African	population	as	a	 means	 to	 shape	 its	 behaviour.	 Rebels	 even	 targeted	 African	 populations	relocated	into	Protected	Villages,	which	the	government	used	to	try	and	prevent	insurgent	contact	with	the	population	(Cilliers,	1986).			






Insurgent	 leaders	tried	to	keep	activity	focused	on	national	and	strategic	goals	rather	 than	 on	 settling	 individual	 scores.	 Insurgents	 had	 to	 follow	 a	 code	 of	conduct,	which	was	drawn	up	in	conjunction	with	spirit	mediums	to	ensure	the	overall	 impact	 on	 the	 population	 of	 insurgent	 activity	 was	 minimised.	 They	banned	 activities	 such	 as	 sex	 with	 locals,	 drinking	 alcohol	 and	 shooting	 wild	animals	 (Chung	 and	Kaarsholm,	 2006).	 They	 also	 deployed	 troops	 away	 from	their	homes,	so	that	they	would	not	get	caught	up	in	local	disputes	(Ranger,	1985).	This	did	not	preclude	insurgent	transgressions	against	the	population,	but	it	may	have	limited	them	and	prevented	insurgent	bad	behaviour	becoming	a	strategic	threat.			On	the	 flip	side,	 insurgent	 leaders	 let	recruits	settle	personal	scores	as	 long	as	these	would	be	well	received	by	the	population	and	fit	within	the	context	of	the	broader	conflict.	Sabotage	and	attacks	on	white	farms	almost	exclusively	focused	on	those	that	had	a	reputation	for	treating	workers	particularly	badly.	The	same	logic	drove	attacks	against	local	African	politicians,	civil	servants	and	tribal	chiefs	(Astrow,	1984).	 It	 is	 likely	 this	engendered	more	 loyalty	 from	fighters	keen	 to	demonstrate	to	the	population	the	immediate	benefits	of	insurgent	activity.		
	
The	African	population	and	the	government	
	Kenneth	Good	argues	that	even	before	1972,	government	control	over	the	African	population	was	structurally	weak.	He	predicted	that	it	would	not	take	much	for	the	 government	 to	 lose	 control	 (1974;	 p10).	 As	 the	 insurgency	 took	 hold,	 the	government	increasingly	resorted	to	violence	as	its	main	means	of	shaping	the	African	population’s	behaviour	(Henriques,	1977).	
	
Punishing	cooperation	













punishment	 for	 supporting	 insurgents	 (Good,	 1974).	 The	 government	deliberately	 restricted	 supplies	 to	 African	 rural	 communities	 and	 burnt	 crops	(Hove,	2012).	The	aim	of	this	was	to	ensure	that	the	villagers	only	had	enough	supplies	to	provide	food	for	themselves,	and	had	no	surplus	to	give	to	insurgents	(Astrow,	 1984).	 It	 limited	 villagers	 to	 cooking	once	 a	 day	 and	killed	peasants’	cattle.	In	Sengwe,	it	killed	as	much	as	80	percent	of	the	locals’	cattle	stock	without	compensation	(Hove,	2012).	Government	strategy	was	not	designed	to	generate	support	from	the	African	population,	it	was	aimed	at	undermining	the	capacity	of	the	population	to	provide	meaningful	support	to	the	rebels.			
Protected	villages	








same	period	the	African	average	wage	rose	from	R$246	to	R$315,	representing	a	difference	of	R$2,330	at	the	start	of	the	conflict	and	R$3,072	in	1971	(Good,	1974;	p17).	 Rent	 and	 energy	 costs	 rose	 by	 around	 70	 percent	 for	 Africans.	 50,000	Africans	were	leaving	school	each	year	and	the	government	provided	no	jobs	for	them	 (Preston,	 2004a;	 p70).	 The	 amount	 of	 Africans	 in	 employment	 declined	from	one	million	to	800,000	between	1975	and	1979	(Astrow,	1984;	p65).	This	coincided	with	 an	African	population	 explosion;	 the	population	 rose	 from	 five	million	Africans	in	1970	to	7.5	million	in	1980.	African	tribal	lands	only	produced	60	percent	 of	 the	maize	needed	 for	 basic	 subsistence	 (ibid.).	 As	 the	Protected	Villages	also	made	it	impossible	for	people	to	visit	clinics	or	feed	cattle	properly,	malnutrition	 became	 rife	 in	 rural	 African	 areas	 (Mushonga,	 2005).	 The	combination	 of	 Protected	 Villages	 and	 economic	 decline	 in	 African	 areas	 was	clearly	designed	to	prevent	rebels	from	converting	sentimental	support	from	the	population	into	behaviours	that	provided	tangible	resources.		
Did	violence	work?	


























	As	the	government	did	not	want	to	reach	out	to	the	African	population	and	allow	it	 to	 access	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 state,	 it	 had	 to	 rely	 on	 getting	 the	most	 of	 its	relationship	with	the	white	population.			
Economic	opportunities		Immigrants	 had	 been	 attracted	 to	 Rhodesia	 with	 promises	 of	 economic	opportunities	and	an	idyllic	lifestyle.	Even	before	the	war,	large	numbers	left	the	country	each	year,	but	this	was	outweighed	by	new	immigrants	(Marston,	1986).	The	country	relied	on	immigrants	to	man	the	armed	forces,	but	in	order	to	sustain	immigration	the	government	needed	to	keep	the	economy	growing.		













completely	 (ibid.).	 Farmers	 had	 also	 organised	 into	 local	 militias	 to	 confront	insurgent	 forces,	 and	 their	 decision	 to	 quit	 an	 area	 often	 eliminated	 local	government	 presence	 (ibid.).	 A	 perception	 of	 insecurity	 began	 to	 pervade	 the	white	population	as	90	percent	of	the	country	came	under	martial	law	by	the	time	of	the	Lancaster	House	agreement	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993).	
	
Conscription	
	As	the	war	escalated,	the	government	extended	those	eligible	for	conscription	and	the	expected	length	of	service.	Conscription	was	eventually	extended	to	include	all	men	 up	 to	 the	 age	 of	 50	 (Godwin	 and	Hancock,	 1993;	 p184).	 Godwin	 and	Hancock	 claim	 this	 was	 extremely	 unpopular	 and	 many	 people	 attempted	 to	avoid	the	draft	(1993).	In	1979,	only	415	out	of	1500	new	white	call-ups	reported	for	duty	(Moorcroft	and	McLaughlin,	2008;	loc3205).			The	extent	of	conscription	also	affected	the	economy.	The	government	refused	to	let	 companies	 hire	African	manpower	 to	 replace	white	workers,	which	meant	production	ground	to	a	halt	(Brownell,	2010).		Companies	often	had	as	much	as	60	 percent	 of	 their	 work	 force	 on	 continuous	 call-ups	 (Godwin	 and	 Hancock,	1993).	Ultimately	the	government	had	to	balance	the	need	to	keep	the	economy	functioning	with	 its	 requirement	 to	 draw	 on	manpower	 to	 secure	 areas	 from	insurgent	influence	(Preston,	2004a).	This	shows	how	important	less	active	types	of	support	are	to	governments	if	they	want	to	keep	the	state	functioning	and	avoid	defeat.			
	
Migration	






escalated	 further	 in	 1976,	 the	 monthly	 net	 departure	 figure	 was	 around	 771	(p163).	 According	 to	 Josiah	 Brownell,	 emigration	 increased	 every	 time	 the	government	appealed	for	extra	support	from	the	population	by	expanding	those	eligible	for	conscription	(Brownell,	2010).	By	the	end	of	1978,	net	emigration	had	reached	around	1400	whites	a	month	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993;	p236).	This	meant	that	Rhodesia	was	losing	around	one	percent	of	its	white	population	every	two	months.			Increasing	 emigration	weakened	 the	 economy.	 The	 construction	 industry	 lost	nearly	 one	 quarter	 of	 its	 workforce	 in	 1976	 (Caute,	 1983;	 p89).	When	 white	farmers	emigrated	the	area	was	generally	surrendered	to	the	insurgents	(ibid.).	The	government	recognised	the	severe	threat	emigration	posed	but	all	attempts	to	boost	immigration	and	make	emigration	harder	failed	(Godwin	and	Hancock,	1993).	From	this	perspective	it	is	easy	to	see	that	the	relationship	between	the	government	 and	 the	 white	 population	 was	 being	 broken	 by	 the	 conflict.	 The	insurgents	 did	 not	 replace	 this	 relationship	with	 one	 of	 their	 own,	 but	 as	 the	European	population	was	transitory	in	nature,	it	always	had	the	option	to	simply	leave	and	withdraw	its	support	for	the	government.	When	the	government	could	no	 longer	 offer	 the	 benefits	 of	 living	 in	 Rhodesia	 that	 the	 white	 population	expected,	 that	 is	 exactly	 what	 it	 started	 doing.	 Ian	 Smith	 recognised	 that	 if	emigration	continued	at	the	same	pace,	the	economy	was	going	to	collapse	and	there	would	be	no	army	to	fight	the	insurgency	(Brownell,	2010).			
Political	power	leads	to	military	control	
	The	rebels	increased	ability	to	generate	support	from	its	constituent	population	and	 the	 equivalent	 decline	 in	 government	 ability	 to	 shape	 settler	 behaviour	explains	the	increase	in	rebel	strength	and	the	eventual	defeat	of	the	government.			
	
The	rebels	mobilise	






forced	recruitment	policy.	By	1974,	ZANLA	had	3,00071	recruits	that	were	almost	all	volunteers	(Chung	and	Kaarsholm,	2006;	p82).	At	the	end	of	1976,	there	were	5,000	insurgents	operating	inside	Rhodesia,	with	many	more	in	external	camps	(Cilliers,	1986;	p83).	When	the	war	finally	came	to	an	end,	best	estimates	suggest	there	 were	 around	 74,000	 insurgents,	 with	 around	 15,000	 operating	 inside	Rhodesia	and	other	in	reserve	or	training	(p239).		The	increase	in	rebel	numbers	operating	inside	Zimbabwe	is	illustrated	in	figure	21.			






















given	the	lack	of	alternative	income	opportunities;	and,	most	importantly,	leaving	a	 space	 for	 the	 insurgency	 to	 build	 structures	 to	manage	 its	 relationship	with	population.	 These	 factors	 combined	 account	 for	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 insurgency	throughout	 the	 1970s.	 While	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 continued	 to	 favour	 the	government,	it	is	clear	that	the	rebels	were	increasingly	able	to	mobilise	support	as	the	war	grew	to	a	close,	exactly	as	we	would	expect	if	the	model	of	war	as	a	mobilisation	competition	is	a	useful	framework	for	studying	civil	wars.		
	
Demobilising	the	government	
















the	 population	 once	 it	 demobilised	 the	 government.	While	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	know	with	any	certainty,	 it	 is	possible	that	 if	 the	Rhodesian	Front	government	had	collapsed	completely,	ZANU	may	not	have	been	able	to	assert	control	over	the	whole	polity.	That	 the	 government	 supported	 the	 transition	might	 explain	why	it	succeeded,	at	least	in	the	short	term.			ZANU’s	decision	to	make	these	concessions	adds	another	element	to	the	factors	affecting	rebel	groups’	decisions	to	engage	in	political	settlements.	In	the	theory	section	of	 this	 thesis,	we	suggested	 that	rebels	 judge	 the	progress	of	a	conflict	solely	by	their	likelihood	of	success.	The	conflict	in	Zimbabwe	showed	that	rebels	also	engage	in	political	processes	based	on	their	ability	to	govern	post-conflict.	This	 may	 open	 up	 new	 opportunities	 for	 identifying	 ‘ripe’	 moments	 for	intervention	in	civil	wars.					






claims	 this	 perception	 explains	 rebel	 leaders’	 refusal	 to	 negotiate	 even	 when	government	forces	heavily	outnumbered	them	in	1975	(1990).	They	believed	the	relations	 they	 had	 established	with	 the	 population	were	 resilient	 enough	 that	they	could	continue	to	function	regardless.	The	key	for	the	rebels	was	whether	they	could	continue	to	undermine	government	authority	in	the	long	term.	Even	as	 early	 as	 1968,	Mugabe’s	 writings	 show	 he	 felt	 confident	 this	 was	 the	 case	(1983).			


























	Once	 again,	 external	 factors	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 determining	 belligerent	behaviour.	 The	 government	 was	 pressured	 into	 the	 1974	 ceasefire	 by	 South	Africa.	This	 also	 coincided	with	Mozambique’s	 independence,	which	expanded	the	amount	of	camps	the	rebels	could	establish	outside	of	 the	country	and	the	areas	 of	 Zimbabwe	 that	 the	 rebels	 could	 enter	 directly,	 as	 shown	 in	 figure	22	(Astrow,	1984).	These	factors	proved	crucial	in	allowing	the	rebels	to	expand	to	the	point	that	the	Rhodesian	government	could	no	longer	shield	its	constituent	population	from	the	effects	of	the	war	or	control	the	rebel’s	constituents	through	violence	alone.			



















reached	 into	 the	population	offers	 a	plausible	 explanation.	Chinese	 support	 to	ZANU	serves	as	a	reminder	for	nations	seeking	to	influence	the	direction	of	civil	wars;	 the	 most	 decisive	 way	 to	 affect	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 civil	 war	 is	 to	 assist	belligerents	in	building	resilient	mobilisation	structures.				
Conclusions	
	






core	of	 the	government’s	 fighting	 forces,	but	 this	was	not	accounted	 for	 in	 the	model.	Moreover,	economic	growth	had	been	slowing	significantly	for	a	number	of	years	before	the	end	of	the	conflict.	Up	until	the	late	1970s	the	government	was	able	to	pass	on	the	effects	of	this	onto	the	African	population.	While	this	may	have	boosted	the	mobilisation	capacity	of	the	rebels,	it	did	not	make	it	more	difficult	for	the	government	to	draw	support	from	its	constituent	population	until	later	in	the	conflict.			Taken	all	 together,	 this	 suggests	a	decline	 in	GDP	has	 to	 specifically	 affect	 the	ability	 of	 the	 government	 to	 generate	 support	 from	 its	 own	 constituent	population	if	it	is	to	lead	to	a	rebel	victory.	A	comprehensive	statistical	model	of	civil	war	would	have	to	capture	the	wide	range	of	ways	this	could	happen.	This	almost	certainly	explains	why	GDP	is	a	key	measure	of	a	war’s	progress,	but	its	substantive	effect	 is	small	 in	the	statistical	model.	Observers	of	single	conflicts	need	to	look	at	which	segments	of	the	population	are	most	likely	to	be	affected	by	any	decline	 in	GDP.	Only	 if	 economic	decline	 leads	 to	a	government	 losing	 the	ability	to	generate	support	specifically	from	its	own	constituent	population	can	we	confidently	assess	that	a	rebel	victory	may	be	imminent.	This	may	take	some	time	from	the	moment	the	government	starts	to	struggle	economically,	as	it	will	likely	cut	spending	in	other	areas	first,	before	reducing	the	benefits	it	distributes	to	its	constituent	population.	In	this	way,	a	drop	in	GDP	becomes	a	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	condition	for	a	rebel	victory.		
Hypotheses	











































Demobilising	the	government		The	 cases	 studies	 demonstrated	 how	 rebels	 demobilise	 governments	 across	 a	variety	of	 contexts	 and	 that	 this	was	 the	key	variable	 in	determining	 the	 final	outcomes	 of	 conflicts.	 Zimbabwean	 insurgents	 put	 the	 government	 under	economic	strain,	which	led	white	settlers,	who	had	previously	provided	most	of	the	 active	 support	 to	 the	 government,	 to	 begin	 leaving	 Zimbabwe.	 The	government	of	the	Khmer	Republic	could	not	sustain	even	the	basic	functions	of	a	state,	and	eventually	collapsed	completely.	The	Khmer	Rouge	then	captured	the	capital.	 The	 rebels	 in	 Nagorno-Karabakh	 completely	 ejected	 the	 government’s	constituency	from	the	region,	eliminating	government	capacity	to	build	any	type	of	 force	 to	 challenge	 rebel	 control.	 The	 conflict	 in	 Burundi	 undermined	 the	government’s	capacity	to	generate	the	resources	necessary	to	keep	the	organs	of	the	state	functioning,	forcing	it	to	engage	in	political	reform	to	end	the	conflict.			












conflict	 through	all	 the	phases	 identified	 in	 the	 ideal-type,	 as	demonstrated	 in	Zimbabwe.			
Demobilising	rebels		Governments,	 if	 they	 are	 to	 fend	 off	 the	 challenges	 of	 organised	 rebel	 forces,	cannot	 blast	 them	 off	 the	 battlefield,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 Rhodesian	government.	 Governments	 win	 when	 they	 demobilise	 rebels	 through	undercutting	their	capacity	to	generate	popular	support.	Whether	a	rebel	group	is	 1,000	 or	 100,000	 strong	 is	 less	 relevant	 than	 its	 ability	 to	 replace	 those	personnel.	It	is	this	regenerative	capacity	that	determines	its	freedom	to	act	and	drain	government	resources	in	the	longer	term.	In	Burundi,	the	government	used	political	reform	to	undercut	the	CNDD-FDD’s	ability	to	mobilise	support,	forcing	the	 insurgency	 to	 embrace	 the	 newly	 formed	 democratic	 structures	 it	 had	previously	rejected.		
Conflict	as	an	iterative	process		Framing	 civil	 war	 as	 an	 asymmetric	 mobilisation	 competition	 turns	 it	 into	 a	continuous	process	of	alliance	building	and	breaking	between	conflict	actors	and	the	 population,	 exactly	 as	 described	 by	 Stathis	 Kalyvas	 (2006).	 Belligerent	behaviour	 during	 the	 conflict	 itself	 determines	 changes	 in	 their	 mobilisation	capacities	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 demobilise	 their	 opponent.	 Academics	 and	government	 analysts	 need	 to	 look	 at	 how	 events	 in	 the	 conflict	 affect	 the	mobilisation	 capacities	 of	 the	 belligerents.	 This	 would	 allow	 them	 to	 better	predict	the	dynamics	of	ongoing	and	future	wars	and	speak	about	civil	war	in	the	same	terms;	a	battle	to	generate	support	from	the	population.			






strength	 of	 belligerents	 in	 the	 case	 studies.	 However,	 the	 way	 development,	governance	 and	 security	 shaped	 population	 behaviour	 differed	 to	 how	 it	 is	currently	described	in	doctrine	(JCS,	2013).			
Development	






These	two	features	of	the	case	studies	explain	why	GDP	appeared	to	have	a	small	substantive	effect	on	civil	war	outcomes	in	the	statistical	model.	A	drop	in	GDP	is	significant	 for	 a	 government,	 but	 it	 only	 leads	 to	 it	 losing	 the	 war	 when	 it	translates	 into	 an	 inability	 to	 specifically	 build	 support	 from	 its	 constituent	population.	Analysts	looking	at	specific	wars	need	to	examine	how	a	decline	in	overall	 economic	 output	 affects	 a	 government’s	 relationship	 with	 its	 own	constituent	 population	 if	 they	 want	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 war	 is	 likely	 to	proceed.			The	case	studies	showed	that	rebel	ability	to	facilitate	socioeconomic	activity	can	also	 play	 a	 role	 in	 determining	 the	 strength	 of	 rebel	 groups.	 Rebel	 groups	 in	Cambodia,	Nagorno-Karabakh	and	Burundi	all	built	effective	shadow	economies	that	 enabled	 them	 to	 generate	 support.	 The	 structures	 these	 rebels	 created	showed	 the	 importance	 of	 socioeconomic	 activity	 beyond	 just	 incentivising	popular	 support.	 Economic	 activity	 generates	 resources,	 such	 as	 finances	 and	food,	which	belligerents	then	use	to	build	and	sustain	armed	forces.	How	conflict	actors	 maximise	 the	 support	 they	 generate	 from	 the	 population,	 in	 terms	 of	tangible	 resources,	 is	 often	 overlooked.	When	 a	 conflict	 actor	 fails	 to	 sustain	socioeconomic	activity	 it	 is	normally	only	analysed	 in	 terms	of	whether	 it	will	induce	popular	opposition	(Lund,	2015).	This	thesis	shows	that	this	misses	out	a	key	variable	for	understanding	the	dynamics	and	outcomes	of	civil	wars.	Analysts	need	to	examine	the	resources	belligerents	are	generating	from	the	population.	The	ability	of	an	actor	to	do	this	determines	its	‘popular	support’,	not	whether	the	population	identify	with	its	goals.			
Governance	


























central	role	of	population-focused	violence	in	shaping	conflict	outcomes.	We	also	uncovered	 an	 additional	 reason	 as	 to	 why	 violence	 may	 fail	 to	 stymie	 rebel	groups.		The	governments	in	Burundi	and	Zimbabwe	contributed	to	their	own	economic	problems	by	coercing	the	population	into	stopping	agricultural	activity	in	many	areas	for	fear	that	the	output	was	being	used	to	support	rebel	groups.	Violence	can	induce	a	population	to	provide	passive	support,	but	cannot	generate	the	level	of	 resources	 of	 a	 mutually	 beneficial	 relationship.	 Violence	 works,	 therefore,	when	governments	can	afford	to	pacify	the	rebel’s	constituent	population	over	the	 long	 term.	 It	 cannot	 create	 effective,	 resource-generating	 sovereign-structures,	be	they	informal	rebel	networks	or	government	institutions.	While	I	hope	the	use	of	violence	against	civilian	populations	is	not	an	area	from	which	Western	 governments	 are	 seeking	 to	 take	 lessons,	 the	need	 to	make	 relations	with	 the	 population	 mutually	 productive	 remains	 pertinent.	 A	 similar	 logic	explains	why	simply	providing	local	security	is	not	enough	to	defeat	insurgencies.	
	












The	role	of	ideology	can,	however,	swing	both	ways.	The	government’s	support	in	Zimbabwe	rested	strongly	on	the	belief	that	whites	were	superior	to	African	communities.	 The	 regime	 could	 not	 countenance	 opening	 up	 electoral	participation	 to	 Africans,	 nor	 could	 it	 expand	 the	 army	 to	 include	 them.	 An	ideology	 can	 provide	 a	 framework	 for	 drawing	 broad	 support	 from	 the	population,	but	it	can	also	constrain	a	belligerent’s	capacity	to	build	relationships	across	different	communities.	Conflict	observers	need	to	understand	whether	a	belligerent’s	 ideology	provides	a	 framework	for	broadening	or	constraining	 its	capacity	to	generate	support	beyond	its	hard-core	group	of	supporters.	Treating	ideology	 in	 this	 way	 provides	 a	 better	 framework	 for	 assessing	 its	 long-term	importance	 in	 particular	 conflicts	 compared	 to	 current	 debates,	 which	 solely	focus	 on	 whether	 an	 ideology	 really	 is	 appealing	 to	 a	 mass	 audience	 (Dagli,	2015).74			
Recommendations		
	A	 number	 of	 recommendations	 fall	 out	 of	 this	 thesis,	 both	 for	 academics	 and	practitioners.			
Academia	







Both	comparative	and	single-conflict	analysis	should	be	examining	government	capacity	to	absorb	the	costs	of	the	conflict	and	rebel	capacity	to	inflict	those	costs,	both	in	the	short	and	long	term.	This	study	represents	a	first	step,	but	there	are	many	ways	it	can	be	improved.	I	have	chosen,	for	a	number	of	reasons,	to	focus	on	the	first	part	of	this	equation;	government	capacity	to	absorb	the	costs	of	the	conflict.	However,	we	also	need	 to	 collect	 comparable	data	on	 rebel	 sovereign	structures.	 Comparable	data	 on	 rebel	 funding,	 shadow	economies,	 governance	structures	 and	 rudimentary	 services	would	offer	 enormous	 insights	 into	what	types	of	rebel	groups	represent	the	most	significant	challenge	to	governments.	We	 would	 then	 be	 in	 a	 better	 position	 to	 directly	 compare	 the	 resilience	 of	government	 and	 rebel	 mobilisation	 capacities	 and	 generate	 a	 more	 powerful	model	of	civil	war	outcomes.			I	have	also	focused	on	a	very	narrow	element	of	government	relations	with	the	population,	namely	formal	political	and	economic	institutions.	As	William	Reno	(2007)	and	Lee	Seymour	(2014)	show,	many	states	are	held	together	by	looser	networks	 of	 informal	 patronage-based	 alliances.	 Partly	 through	 its	 own	mismanagement,	 this	 was	 the	 situation	 the	 coalition	 found	 itself	 in	 both	Afghanistan	 and	 Iraq.	 The	 policy	 and	military	 communities	 need	 studies	 that	explore	what	works	in	these	types	of	situations.	As	Mark	Duffield	points	out,	the	ability	of	local	actors	to	exploit	Western	interventions	for	their	own	ends	has,	in	many	cases,	just	further	entrenched	the	social,	political	and	economic	drivers	of	these	 wars	 (2005).	 The	 broader	 framework	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis	 offers	 a	sensible	template	for	exploring	this	phenomenon.			
Policymakers	




















	Regardless	of	whether	an	analyst	is	from	academia	or	the	policy	community,	this	thesis	demonstrates	the	utility	of	viewing	civil	war	as	an	asymmetric	mobilisation	competition.	The	explanation	for	the	beginning,	middle	and	end	of	civil	wars,	past,	present	 and	 future,	will	 be	 found	 in	 changes	 to	 the	mobilisation	 capacities	 of	conflict	 actors.	 Civil	 war	 is	 about	 controlling	 the	 state,	 which	means	 building	resilient	sovereign	alliances	across	the	population	in	order	to	create	a	resilient	regeneration	capacity.	Governments	need	to	assert	sovereignty	across	the	whole	state,	while	rebels	seek	to	undermine	their	solution	for	achieving	this,	inducing	the	government	to	collapse.	Regenerative	capacity	is	determined	by	the	ability	of	a	conflict	to	generate	popular	support;	understood	as	a	behaviour	not	sentiment.	This	 is	how	popular	support	determines	 the	outcome	of	conflicts	and	explains	how	small	rebel	groups	are	able	to	frustrate	the	most	powerful	military	forces	in	the	world.					 	
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